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Wildfires are a growing problem in the United States, and military aircraft are 
increasingly mobilized in support of civilian wildfire suppression efforts. The photogenic 
qualities of aircraft distributing a trail of red “slurry” over a wildfire increase the public’s 
expectation of fire suppression from the air. The problem is that Department of Defense 
(DOD) aircraft are not dispatched to civilian wildfires in a timely manner, resulting in 
lives lost, property destroyed, and critical infrastructure damaged. The research question 
considered by this thesis is, “What improvements can be implemented to existing local, 
state, and federal protocols to provide a more timely response to civilian wildfires by 
DOD aircraft?” The current system is complicated and confusing, involving federal laws, 
such as the Economy and Stafford acts; DOD doctrine and instruction, such as Defense 
Support to (of) Civil Authorities and Immediate Response Authority; and civilian 
agencies, such as the National Interagency Fire Center with its Military Use Handbook in 
the existing process to dispatch military aircraft to civilian wildfires. The results of the 
study recommend that (1) DOD aircraft be more closely coordinated with civilian aircraft 
via the IRA for responding to civilian wildfires, and that (2) the Economy and Stafford 
acts be modified to improve the efficiency with which military aircraft respond to civilian 
wildfires. 
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Citizens and many local firefighters poorly understand the use of aircraft for 
wildfire suppression. There is a basic lack of knowledge because wildfires in general and 
the use of aircraft for fire suppression are both complex and expensive issues. Although 
the photogenic qualities of an aircraft with a trail of red “slurry” (retardant)1 over a 
wildfire are well known, the use of aircraft is regulated by many variables. Some of those 
variables include laws, resource sharing agreements, weather, terrain, fire behavior, 
aircraft capabilities, and many others. 
The National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) is the agency with primary 
responsibility for coordinating the response to wildfire in the United States. The agency’s 
homepage states, “The National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC), located in Boise, Idaho, 
is the nation’s support center for wildland firefighting.”2 The NIFC also manages the 
response of aircraft to wildfire. The benefit of aircraft response to wildfire is that, “Air 
attack can be useful in delaying fire growth, or even suppressing small fires, before 
ground resources arrive.”3 Regardless, after water or retardant is dropped near a wildfire, 
firefighters on the ground must follow-up with additional measures to ensure that the fire 
is completely extinguished. 
The United States Forest Service (USFS) and other federal agencies utilize 
aircraft to support personnel on the ground in wildfire suppression.4 However, the 
national fleet of aircraft used for wildfire suppression is aging. According to a 2013 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) study, “The average large air tanker is more 
                                                 
1 National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Glossary of Wildland Fire Terminology (PMS 205) (Boise, 
ID: National Wildfire Coordinating Group, 2014), 78. Fire Retardant—Any substance except plain water 
that by chemical or physical action reduces flammability of fuels or slows their rate of combustion. 
2 “NIFC Home,” accessed September 7, 2015, https://www.nifc.gov/. 
3 Edward G. Keating et al., Air Attack Against Wildfires: Understanding U.S. Forest Service 
Requirements for Large Aircraft (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2012), 9. 
4 Other federal agencies utilizing aircraft for wildfire suppression include the Bureau of Land 
Management (BLM), the Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS), and the National Park Service (NPS). 
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than 50 years old”5 Due in part to the small and aging USFS fleet, most firefighting 
aircraft, “Are obtained through contracts with private industry vendors.”6 In addition to 
federally owned and contractually operated aircraft, the Department of Defense (DOD) 
also has aircraft available for wildfire suppression. 
Fighting wildfires is not the DOD’s primary mission. However, both military 
helicopters and aircraft have been adapted to fight wildfires. Helicopters use a bucket 
suspended from a cable to drop water. C-130 military airplanes have been modified to 
fight wildfires with Modular Airborne Fire Fighting Systems (MAFFS). MAFFS units 
can discharge up to 3,000 gallons of water or fire retardant over a wildfire.7 
The problem is that DOD aircraft are not dispatched to civilian wildfires in a 
timely manner, resulting in lives lost, property destroyed, and critical infrastructure 
damage, among other effects. This problem is the result of existing federal policies and 
long-term institutional inefficiencies. Current policy states that DOD aircraft are not 
dispatched to civilian wildfires until all USFS owned and/or contracted aircraft are 
engaged. This policy results in civilian aircraft responding from further distances when 
military aircraft are closer. The major research question is “What improvements can be 
implemented to existing local, state, and federal protocols to provide a more timely 
response to civilian wildfires by DOD aircraft?” 
This thesis uses prescriptive research. Prescriptive research is similar to 
evaluative research but, “Goes a step further, beyond identifying success or performance 
or outcomes, and actually recommends solutions or new ideas. Prescriptive research (also 
known as normative research), comes up with an assertion, a solution, a proposal for how 
to address a known problem space.”8 The desired outcome of this prescriptive research is 
                                                 
5 United States Government Accountability Office, Wildland Fire Management: Improvements 
Needed in Information, Collaboration, and Planning to Enhance Federal Fire Aviation Success (GAO-13-
684) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013), 2.  
6 Ibid., 9. 
7 National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Interagency Aerial Supervision Guide (NFES 002544, PMS 
505) (Boise, ID: National Interagency Fire Center, 2014), 68. 
8 Lauren Wollman, Research Paradigms, Naval Postgraduate School video, Research Colloquium 
course, recorded summer 2008, 7:03, https://www.chds.us/coursefiles/research/lectures/research_para 
digms/player.html. 
 xix
to offer alternatives to the current system used for deploying military aircraft to civilian 
wildfires. 
A system is in place that allows the USFS, state, and local governments to 
request, dispatch, and deploy military aircraft to civilian wildfires. However, this system 
must be updated to improve the efficiency of accessing DOD aircraft. This thesis 
suggests options to the current system of utilizing aircraft for wildfire suppression. One 
option is simply to maintain the existing system without modification. Another choice is 
to eliminate the use of DOD aircraft for response to civilian wildfires. In addition, this 
thesis suggests three options to improve the current system of utilizing DOD aircraft for 
wildfire suppression including (1) implement the DOD’s Immediate Response Authority 
(IRA) to use military aircraft at the same time as civilian aircraft, (2) modify laws that 
establish barriers to the use of DOD aircraft, and (3) encourage the use of more resource 
sharing agreements between local jurisdictions and neighboring military installations. 
The thesis concludes with two recommendations to improve the response of 
military aircraft to civilian wildfires. The recommendations are to (1) take greater 
advantage of the IRA to consider the use of military aircraft at the same time that civilian 
aircraft are dispatched, and (2) modify existing laws that negatively impact the use of 
DOD aircraft to civilian wildfires. 
The first recommendation is that the DOD should be utilized as a “first 
responder” through the IRA. The advantage to this recommendation is that firefighting 
aircraft of any kind are dispatched as soon as a wildfire is known. Utilizing the military in 
this manner augments civilian resources. This change could be implemented without any 
changes to existing federal laws or military doctrine. The change would simply be 
procedural in nature, requiring an update to the deployment policies of the USFS and the 
DOD. 
The second recommendation suggests that two federal laws could be updated to 
improve the efficiency of DOD aircraft deployment to civilian wildfires. The two laws 
are the Economy and Stafford Acts. The Economy Act has been in effect since 1932 and 
represents the United States government’s (USG) long-standing desire to avoid 
 xx
competition with private business. However, the law is written in a broad manner, stating 
specifically that an order for resources with another agency may be requested if the, 
“Ordered goods or services cannot be provided by contract as conveniently or cheaply by 
a commercial enterprise.”9 For many years, this phrase has been viewed as a restriction 
regarding the use of military aircraft. The Stafford Act includes the same bias to non-
competition as the Economy Act.10 This bias is problematic when considering specialized 
resources, such as aircraft. In addition, the Stafford Act restricts the time that federal 
resources can be deployed for emergencies to 10 days.11 In the case of large wildfires, 
this timeframe is too restrictive, as many wildfires last much longer than 10 days. 
  
                                                 
9 Money and Finance, 31 U.S.C. § 1535 (2003). 
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After the Hayman Fire of 2002,1 the Colorado Springs Fire Department (CSFD) 
hosted a wildfire mitigation2 seminar for citizens. When the presentations ended, a citizen 
approached me and asked why it took so long to use the aircraft equipped with MAFFS 
(Modular Airborne Fire Fighting Systems)3 from neighboring Peterson Air Force Base 
(PAFB) to help fight the fire. My totally inadequate explanation was that due to current 
federal policies, Department of Defense (DOD) aircraft were not requested until all 
United States Forest Service (USFS) aircraft, including both aircraft owned by the USFS 
and aircraft contracted by the USFS, were in use. I explained that the existing federal 
policy was a contracting issue, and in general, the issue is a “non-compete” rule that 
prevented DOD assets from competing with (i.e., “taking money away from”) civilian 
contractors. In the case of wildfires, DOD aircraft could not be utilized until all 
contracted aircraft were engaged. 
The citizen thought my answer was completely ridiculous and told me so in no 
uncertain terms. His suggestion was that I should fix the problem. He remained angry and 
unconvinced when I explained that these policies were not something with which local 
government was directly involved. I further explained that it would be unlikely for a local 
government, such as the city of Colorado Springs, to influence this long-standing policy. 
Ten years later, after the Waldo Canyon Fire in 2012, a USFS report stated, “The 
community doesn’t understand why we can’t use the military resources; we need a better 
understanding of how the military can be involved.”4 This thesis, then, is a personal 
challenge concerned with how existing federal practices, policies, and procedures may be 
                                                 
1 Russell T. Graham, ed., Hayman Fire Case Study, General Technical Report (RMRS-GTR-114) 
(Ogden, UT: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Rocky Mountain Research Station, 2003). 
2 “Wildfire Mitigation,” April 3, 2014, http://csfd.coloradosprings.gov/public-safety/fire/prevention-
and-safety/wildfire-mitigation. 
3 “Modular Airborne Firefighting System,” December 17, 2012, http://www.302aw.afrc.af.mil/ 
library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=4555. 
4 Bob Houseman et al., Waldo Canyon Fire Review, Pike and San Isabel National Forests, USDA 
Forest Service (Lakewood, CO: United States Forest Service, 2013), 10. 
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amended to address this citizen’s concerns regarding the use of military aircraft during 
civilian wildfires. 
Citizens and even many local firefighters poorly understand the use of aircraft for 
wildfire suppression. There is a basic lack of knowledge because wildfires in general and 
the use of aircraft to fight wildfire are complex and expensive issues. The citizen 
questioning why MAFFS-equipped aircraft were not deployed to the Hayman Fire 
suffered from this same lack of knowledge. For example, although the photogenic 
qualities of an aircraft with a trail of red “slurry” (retardant)5 over a wildfire make for 
gripping news coverage and arouse the public’s expectation of fire suppression from the 
air, the actual use of firefighting aircraft is contingent on many variables, including laws, 
resource sharing agreements, weather, terrain, fire behavior, and aircraft capabilities, 
among others. 
Also, aircraft do not completely extinguish wildfires. Aircraft, whether rotor wing 
or fixed wing, or whether civilian aircraft or military aircraft, only limit the spread of 
wildfires. The benefit to aircraft response is that “Air attack can be useful in delaying fire 
growth, or even suppressing small fires, before ground resources arrive.”6 Regardless, 
after water or retardant is dropped near a wildfire, personnel on the ground must follow 
up with additional measures to ensure that the fire is extinguished. The costs involved 
with the use of aircraft, over and above the required cost of ground forces, dramatically 
add to the overall cost of wildfire suppression. 
Still, regardless of the costs or limitations, in some situations, DOD assets could 
make a difference. Thus, I return to the question that the citizen asked me in 2002. Can 
the use of military aircraft to fight civilian wildfires be more efficient than the current 
model? For this thesis, I have researched a more efficient way for local communities to 
receive assistance from DOD aircraft (both fixed wing and rotor) during wildfire 
incidents. The outcome has suggested faster and more efficient yet safe and cost effective 
                                                 
5 National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Glossary of Wildland Fire Terminology (PMS 205) (Boise, 
ID: National Wildfire Coordinating Group, 2014), 78. Fire Retardant—Any substance except plain water 
that by chemical or physical action reduces flammability of fuels or slows their rate of combustion. 
6 Edward G. Keating et al., Air Attack Against Wildfires: Understanding U.S. Forest Service 
Requirements for Large Aircraft (Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2012), 9. 
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ways to deploy military aircraft to civilian wildfire emergencies than the system in use 
today. From a broader perspective, the research may more directly link local communities 
in the future to United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).7 This research may 
also refine guidance for the DOD’s Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA).8 A 
final benefit might be that an updated system identifies a more effective tool for local 
communities to access other DOD assets during an “all-hazards” emergency.9 
A. THE PROBLEM 
The problem is that DOD aircraft are not dispatched to civilian wildfires in a 
timely manner, resulting in lives lost, property destroyed, and critical infrastructure 
damage, among other effects. This problem is the result of existing federal policies and 
long-term institutional inefficiencies. The federal system by which firefighting aircraft 
are deployed and utilized has been in place for many years. Federal users of the system 
(primarily the USFS and the DOD) are familiar and comfortable with the arrangement. 
Local firefighters and government officials are less familiar with the system and are often 
confused and frustrated by this existing federal system. 
Barriers are built into the current system for receiving timely assistance directly 
from DOD assets. One example of the barriers inherent in the existing system is that 
resource-sharing agreements between local, state, and federal governments, as well as 
with private contractors, are ubiquitous. These many agreements create confusion and are 
sometimes in conflict with one another. The lack of clarity leads to inefficiencies in 
dispatching the closest appropriate aircraft, civilian or military, to wildfires. 
Another example of existing inefficiency is known as the “non-compete” rule. 
The requirement that all USFS aircraft are utilized before requesting DOD aircraft is the 
result of the 1932 Economy Act (31 U.S.C. § 1535). The Economy Act is the guidance by 
                                                 
7 “Defending Our Homeland,” December 6, 2014, http://www.northcom.mil/Home.aspx. 
8 United States Library of Congress, Military Support to Civil Authorities: The Role of the Department 
of Defense in Support of Homeland Defense (Washington, DC: United States Library of Congress, 2007). 
See for an overview of MSCA. 
9 Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: What Is Homeland Security?” Homeland 
Security Affairs 4, no. 2 (June 2008): 2, https://www.hsaj.org/articles/118. See “all-hazards” definition. 
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which one federal agency may purchase goods or services from another federal agency. 
All the requirements of the Economy Act must be met before military aircraft can be used 
in a wildfire environment.10 The prerequisites limit the ability of the DOD to deploy 
resources, including aircraft, to wildfires. 
Local citizens whose lives and property are being threatened by wildfires also 
misunderstand the dispatching of DOD aircraft to civilian wildfires. From a citizen’s 
perspective, the closest aircraft equipped to fight wildfires ought to be deployed to their 
location regardless of whether the aircraft belongs to the USFS, the DOD, or to another 
entity. Citizens simply want help. During the Hayman Fire, for example, some citizens 
were outraged over the initial lack of response from the DOD (located less than 60 air 
miles from the fire) while waiting for USFS aircraft to arrive from much further away. As 
natural resources, homes, personal property, and infrastructure burned, confusion, 
frustration, anger, and complaints from citizens increased while the closer DOD aircraft 
remained on the ground. 
The costs associated with the current situation, in terms of lives lost, natural 
resources damaged, homes and personal property burned, and critical infrastructure 
destroyed, vary from incident to incident depending on the location of the fire. In rural, 
undeveloped areas, the cost may only be to the natural resource, which has natural 
regenerative properties and which is beneficial for long-term forest health. In an undated 
pamphlet, CAL FIRE (the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection) states, 
“Fire that is low in intensity and does not grow out of control benefits our wildlands and 
is actually vital to the survival of several species.”11 Wildfires in the wildland-urban 
                                                 
10 Money and Finance, 31 U.S.C. § 1535 (1932), 152. The four requirements are (1) funds are 
available,( 2) the head of the ordering agency or unit decides the order is in the best interest of the United 
States government (USG), (3) the agency or unit to fill the order is able to provide or get by contract the 
ordered goods or services, and (4) the head of the agency decides ordered goods or services cannot be 
provided by contract as conveniently or cheaply by a commercial enterprise. 
11 “Benefits of Fire,” accessed March 7, 2015, http://www.fire.ca.gov/communications/downloads/ 
fact_sheets/TheBenefitsofFire.pdf. 
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interface (WUI),12 however, can result in hundreds of millions of dollars in damages to 
property. For example, WUI fires in Colorado during 2012 resulted in $449.7 million in 
damages.13 
B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
It is frustrating for local officials, firefighters, and citizens to have resources 
available but not utilize them due to antiquated, bureaucratic rules. Understanding how 
government at all levels can help citizens during a crisis, in this case, during a wildfire, is 
the basis for this thesis. Given the lack of understanding within local government, among 
responders, and from citizens, this thesis researches questions to help improve the current 
situation. 
The major research question contemplated is “What improvements can be 
implemented to existing local, state, and federal protocols to provide a more timely 
response to civilian wildfires by DOD aircraft?” Additional questions for this topic to 
help clarify and refine the research include the following. 
 What recommendations can be made to modify existing federal law to 
improve local government access to military aircraft for responding to 
civilian wildfire emergencies? 
 What improvements can be implemented within federal contracting 
requirements to simplify the use of military aircraft at civilian wildfire 
emergencies? 
 How can National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) guidelines for 
utilizing military aircraft be modified to allow for faster response to local 
wildfire incidents? 
 Can the civil-military interface in the United States (U.S.), specifically for 
the use of military aircraft during civilian wildfires, be improved based on 
the experiences of and examples from other countries? 
                                                 
12 National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Glossary of Wildland Fire Terminology (PMS 205), 187. 
Wildland Urban Interface—The line, area, or zone where structures and other human development meet or 
intermingle with undeveloped wildland or vegetative fuels. Describes an area within or adjacent to private 
and public property where mitigation actions can prevent damage or loss from wildfire. 
13 Andrew Wineke, “Waldo Canyon Fire Most Expensive in State History,” The Gazette, July 17, 
2012, http://gazette.com/waldo-canyon-fire-most-expensive-in-state-history/article/141783. 
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C. RELEVANCE TO HOMELAND DEFENSE AND SECURITY 
Annually, the United States experiences multiple wildfires within its 
approximately 751 million acres of forest.14 According to the NIFC, the United States 
experienced 63,312 wildfires in 2014. Those fires burned 3,595,613 acres.15 In addition 
to the number of fires and acres burned, lives are lost (both citizen’s lives and 
firefighter’s lives), homes and other personal property are burned, infrastructure (for 
example, utilities) is damaged or destroyed, and a great deal of money is spent in the 
control of wildfires. Gorte, in a 2013 research project for Headwaters Economics, reports 
that for the 10 years from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2012, the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA) and the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) averaged $3.13 
billion annually in wildfire suppression costs.16 
The annual cost to suppress wildfires is growing. In 1994, the USFS spent 
approximately 16 percent of its annual budget for fire suppression. In 2015, fire 
suppression will consume an estimated 52 percent of the USFS budget. As reported in 
USA Today concerning 2015, “For the first time in its 110-year history, the U.S. Forest 
Service says it spends more than 50 percent of its annual budget on firefighting.”17 This 
cost does not include local and state spending for wildfire suppression. State spending  
on wildfire suppression, then, is reported to have doubled from 1998 to 2014, when  
$1.6 billion was spent.18 Projections estimate that by 2025, the USFS will spend  
67 percent of its budget to suppress wildfires.19 Simply stated, wildfires are expensive. 
                                                 
14 “Forestry—Facts and Figures,” August 13, 2013, http://www.epa.gov/agriculture/forestry.html. 
15 “Total Wildland Fires and Acres 1960–2009,” accessed May 30, 2015, http://www.nifc.gov/fire 
Info/fireInfo_stats_totalFires.html.  
16 Ross Gorte, “The Rising Cost of Wildfire Protection,” Headwaters Economics, 2013, 4. The 
firefighting resources of the USDA are in the United States Forest Service (USFS) while the firefighting 
resources of the DOI are in the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the National Park Service (NPS), and 
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). 
17 Doyle Rice, “Wildfires Decimate U.S. Forest Service Budget,” USA Today, August 6, 2015, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/08/05/firefighting-costs-soar-blazes-worsen-
west/31153701/. 
18 Christopher Topik, “Wildfires Burn Science Capacity,” Science 349, no. 6254 (September 2015): 
1263. 
19 Rice, “Wildfires Decimate U.S. Forest Service Budget.” 
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One of the factors that contribute to the expensive cost of fighting wildfires is the 
use of aircraft. In the United States, both fixed wing (air tankers) and rotor wing 
(helicopters) are used in the suppression of wildfires. A 2013 Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) report identifies “flight hour rate” from $225 to $23,300 depending on the 
type of aircraft and the type of contract.20 Based on these hourly rates, an eight-hour day 
of flying equates to a range of from $1,800 per day to $186,400 per day.21 
The costs stand to rise. Wildfires are becoming more severe as noted by the fact 
that “The six worst fire seasons since 1960 have come since 2000.”22 In addition, the 
wildfire season is getting longer with reports varying that the season is from 42 to 78 
days longer over the past 30 to 40 years. More and more people are also living in the 
WUI,23 where reliance on aircraft to protect homes is growing. 
The increase in wildfires and the cost to suppress them indicate that the use of 
DOD aircraft to assist in suppressing civilian wildfires may grow with the need. The cost 
of aircraft, however, is warranted based on their benefits to the suppression of a wildfire. 
1. Aircraft and Wildfire: Pros and Cons 
The USFS identifies seven benefits associated with the use of aircraft for fighting 
wildfires. 
 Delivering equipment and supplies 
 Transporting firefighters 
 Deploying “smokejumpers” and rappellers 
 Providing reconnaissance of fires 
 Identifying specific fire locations and fire behavior 
                                                 
20 United States Government Accountability Office, Wildland Fire Management: Improvements 
Needed in Information, Collaboration, and Planning to Enhance Federal Fire Aviation Success (GAO-13-
684) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013), 42. 
21 Ibid. 
22 John Schwartz, “As Fires Grow, A New Landscape Appears in the West,” The New York Times, 
September 21, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/science/as-fires-grow-a-new-landscape-appears-
in-the-west.html?_r=0. 
23 Topik, “Wildfires Burn Science Capacity,” 1263. 
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 Dropping “fire retardant or water to slow down a fire so firefighters can 
contain it” 
 Igniting prescribed fires24 
However, some negatives are associated with the use of aircraft during wildfires. 
First, they are a dangerous tool, for the pilots and for firefighters on the ground. 
During 2002 and again in 2012, two accidents occurred in both years that resulted in 
fatalities.25 Water or retardant striking firefighters from the air can also result in serious 
injuries and possibly death. 
Second, the national fleet of aircraft used for wildfire suppression is aging and 
shrinking. According to a GAO study, “the average large air tanker is more than 50 years 
old.”26 Further, “The number of large airtankers available under federal contract 
decreased substantially in the last decade, from 44 in 2002 to 8 in early 2013.”27 
Third, aircraft is limited in effectiveness based on terrain and weather conditions. 
Depending on the type of aircraft, mountainous terrain cannot be traversed at the 
elevation needed to drop water or fire suppression retardant effectively. In addition, 
visibility, smoke conditions, and other factors contribute to the difficulty encountered 
flying at low altitude in mountains. Weather conditions, such as thunderstorms and high 
winds, also limit the ability of aircraft to fly during wildfires.  
2. Use of Department of Defense Aircraft in Wildfires 
Fighting wildfires is not the military’s primary mission. However, both military 
helicopters and airplanes can be adapted to fight wildfires. Simply stated, helicopters use 
a bucket suspended from a cable to drop water. Military airplanes have been adapted to 
fight wildfires with MAFFS. MAFFS units are loaded onto C-130 aircraft that are then 
flown over wildfires where water, firefighting foam, or fire retardant is dropped. 
                                                 
24 “Fire and Aviation Management—Aviation,” November 15, 2014. http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/ 
aviation/. 
25 United States Government Accountability Office, Wildland Fire Management: Improvements 
Needed in Information, Collaboration, and Planning to Enhance Federal Fire Aviation Success, 2. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Ibid., 1. 
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The use of military aircraft for wildfire suppression is one specific example of 
civil-military interface. The civil-military interface in the United States is guided by a 
complex variety of rules, regulations, and laws. Examples of policies and laws for 
utilizing DOD aircraft in wildfire suppression include the Posse Comitatus Act,28 the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act,29 Immediate Response 
Authority,30 the Economy Act,31 and Defense Support of Civil Authorities,32 among 
others. 
This research and the resulting recommendations will be important to many 
audiences from a homeland security perspective. Relative to protecting the homeland, 
civilian leaders will be interested because they desire the support of military aircraft 
when wildfires are expanding beyond local capabilities. Citizens at risk from wildfires 
will be interested because they seek faster response from firefighting aircraft. 
Communities throughout the nation may be interested in this research, especially if DOD 
aircraft may be utilized to support a wider variety of local emergencies (not limited to 
wildfires). USFS personnel will be impacted by changes to their procedures. Military 
leadership will be interested because of the potential impact on their responsibilities, 
decision-making, and resource management. This research is also directly applicable to 
the DOD’s Immediate Response Authority (IRA) “To save lives, prevent human 
suffering, or mitigate great property damage.”33 
                                                 
28 Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. §1385. 
29 The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93–288, as 
amended. 
30 United States Department of Defense, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Handbook: 
Tactical Level Commander and Staff Toolkit (GTA 90–01-021) (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 
2010), 3–3. 
31 The Economy Act of 1932, as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 1535. 
32 United States Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive Number 3025.18, 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010), 16. 
33 United States Department of Defense, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Handbook: 
Tactical Level Commander and Staff Toolkit, 3–3. 
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D. ASSUMPTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis is bounded by two primary assumptions. First, it is assumed that 
wildfires are a problem of national interest from a homeland defense and security 
standpoint. Wildfires have been considered for use as a weapon by terrorist 
organizations.34 Preparing for terrorism of any kind can limit damage, enhance recovery, 
and reduce fear. Both the DOD and civilian agencies are well-served by preparing for 
wildfires as an act of terrorism. 
A second assumption, regardless of the cause of wildfires, is that the current 
system for deploying aircraft to wildfires can be improved and efficiencies can be 
identified. Generally, current policy states that DOD aircraft are not dispatched to civilian 
wildfires until all USFS owned and/or contracted aircraft are engaged. This policy results 
in civilian aircraft responding from further distances when military aircraft, either fixed 
wing or rotor wing, are geographically closer. The current system, limited by provisions 
of the Economy Act of 193235 and other regulations, may result in civilian lives lost, 
increased property damage, and destroyed natural resources. The current situation can be 
improved.  
Efficiencies can also be gained from eliminating contradictions in policy. For 
example, while the Economy Act of 1932 limits the use of DOD aircraft by the USFS, 
DOD IRA instructs military commanders to respond for civil support, “…Under 
imminently serious conditions and if time does not permit approval from higher 
authority, … to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage 
within the United States.”36 
Proposed changes to existing policies, identified as a result of this research, will 
support efforts to lessen the impact from wildfires. Analyzing previous local Colorado 
                                                 
34 United States Department of Homeland Security et al., Note: Terrorist Interest in Using Fire as a 
Weapon (IA-0140-12) (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2012), 3. 
35 Money and Finance, 31 U.S.C. § 1535 (2003). 
36 Deputy Secretary of Defense, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), DOD Directive 
3025.18, Washington, DC: Deputy Secretary of Defense, 2010. 
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wildfire events37 and their use of aircraft; reviewing the existing guidelines at the local, 
state, and federal levels; comparing the U.S. civil-military interface to other countries’ 
use of military aircraft for wildfires; and proposing examples of different approaches, are 
used to support or refute this hypothesis. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review for this thesis incorporates data from existing information 
regarding DOD doctrine, including Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) and 
other relevant information; current policies and practices from civilian wildfire agencies; 
resource-sharing agreements, such as the use of the Emergency Management Assistance 
Compact (EMAC); and other similar agreements (such as mutual aid agreements (MAA), 
intergovernmental agreements (IGA), and memoranda of understanding (MOU)); 
information from Canada and Australia regarding the use of aircraft to attack wildfires; 
and finally, legal ramifications pertaining to the civil-military interface. 
1. United States Department of Defense 
The U.S. DOD utilizes a variety of missions to support civil authorities, including 
responding to civilian wildfires. These activities are highly regulated. The primary means 
by which the DOD provides rapid assistance to their neighboring communities is via the 
IRA. The IRA permits installation commanders to act outside of their installation 
boundary to “rapidly respond and provide immediate assistance to civil authorities and 
first responders in order to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property 
damage.”38 Local DOD leadership may act to use their federal assets, including aircraft, 
without the permission of higher authority/command. The local response must not last 
more than 72 hours. One example providing specific directions for IRA are outlined in 
the DSCA Taskbook: Tactical Level Commander and Staff Tool Kit.39 In addition to 
                                                 
37 The three Colorado wildfire events reviewed are the Hayman Fire of 2002, the Waldo Canyon Fire 
from 2012, and the Black Forest Fire during 2013. 
38 Eric L. Leshinsky, “Prepared for Disaster? Improving the Department of Defense’s Immediate 
Response Authority” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2006), 57. 
39 United States Department of Defense, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Handbook: 
Tactical Level Commander and Staff Toolkit, 3–3. 
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wildfires, deployments from military installations to support civil authorities via 
immediate response include blizzards, flooding, pandemic, and other situations that 
overwhelm the local population. 
Another method by which the DOD may assist local populations is via DSCA. 
DSCA is regulated by DOD Directive 3025.18 and is defined by Directive 3025.18 as: 
Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD 
contract personnel, DOD Component assets, and National Guard forces 
(when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the 
affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in title 32, U.S.C., 
status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for 
domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic 
activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as 
civil support.40 
The phrase, “For domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic 
activities” in this broadly written directive appears to provide an avenue for requesting 
the use of military aircraft during wildfires. 
Contrasting the IRA and DSCA, both the IRA and the DSCA provide support to 
civilian authorities, but provide that civilian support differently. The IRA does not have 
to be a written request, is not dependent on the ability to reimburse for services, and 
generally, is a short-term arrangement lasting less than 72 hours. DSCA requires a 
written request, includes reimbursement per the Stafford Act, and could be utilized for a 
longer term than 72 hours.41 While the IRA and DSCA both permit the military to 
respond to civilian emergencies, the IRA allows action more quickly but for a shorter 
duration as compared to DSCA, which is more cumbersome to employ but once 
established, authorizes support for a longer duration. 
The DOD also works closely with the DOI and the USDA. Working together, the 
DOD, DOI, and USDA have entered into an interagency agreement to provide temporary 
                                                 
40 United States Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive Number 3025.18, 16. 
41 United States Department of Defense, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Handbook: 
Tactical Level Commander and Staff Toolkit, 3–5. 
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support of DOD assets for response to civilian wildfires.42 Titled Interagency Agreement 
for the Provision of Temporary Support during Wildland Firefighting Operations, this 
agreement is administered by the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC), located in 
Boise, ID, and staffed with representatives from multiple federal agencies, including the 
DOD. Similar to DSCA requests, the activation of this agreement must be in writing and 
must provide for reimbursement.43 The agreement does provide for the use of DOD 
aircraft capable of performing a wildfire suppression mission. Examples are helicopters 
capable of providing water bucket operations and aircraft with the ability to support 
MAFFS operations.44 
2. Civilian Wildfire Agencies 
The U.S. civilian response to wildfires is organized by many federal agencies. 
These agencies provide an avenue for research regarding the use of military aircraft in 
support of wildfire suppression. Examples of civilian agencies directly involved in 
responding to wildfires are the NWCG, the NIFC, and many others. 
The NWCG is comprised of multiple civilian federal agencies including the 
USFS, the BLM, the NPS, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and the USFWS. In 
addition, the National Association of State Foresters (NASF), the Intertribal Timber 
Council, the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), and the United States Fire 
Administration (USFA) are all represented in the NWCG.45 
The NWCG through its member agencies provide guidelines, training, and 
coordination regarding the use of both civilian and military resources during wildfire 
emergencies in its mission statement. The NWCG’s mission statement states: 
The National Wildfire Coordinating Group (NWCG) provides national 
leadership to develop, maintain, and communicate interagency standards, 
                                                 
42 United States Department of the Interior, United States Department of Agriculture, and United 
States Department of Defense, Interagency Agreement for the Provision of Temporary Support During 
Wildland Firefighting Operations, DOI (BLM-FAD) Agreement No. L10PG00548, USDA (USFS-NIFC) 
Agreement No. 10-IA-11130206-008 (Washington, DC: National Interagency Fire Center, 2010), 1. 
43 Ibid., 2. 
44 Ibid., 3. 
45 “Members,” accessed August 30, 2015, http://www.nwcg.gov/. 
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guidelines, qualifications, training and other capabilities that enable 
interoperable operations among federal and non-federal entities.46 
The NWCG is also well-versed in the use of aircraft for wildfire suppression, both 
civilian and military. The use of aircraft has long been a strategy in combating wildfire. 
In an August, 2013 report, the GAO reports in its opening statement:  
Over the last 5 (five) decades, aircraft have played an important role in 
wildland fire suppression activities throughout the country by conducting 
aerial surveillance, delivering supplies and firefighters, and dropping 
retardant to slow fire growth or water to suppress fires.47 
The NWCG has been involved in the wildfire for those same five decades since its 
establishment in 1976. Another federal agency that supports the national response to 
wildfire since its inception in 1965 is the NIFC.48 
The NIFC is experienced in the use of all types of DOD assets for wildfire 
suppression. In the past, DOD assets, such as soldiers, fire trucks, aircraft, and other 
equipment, have all been used in support of civilian emergencies involving wildfires. 
From the NIFC’s past experiences, and to guide the future deployment of military 
resources, the NIFC has developed a Military Use Handbook. The Military Use 
Handbook is comprehensive and includes Chapter 70–Aviation.49 As stated therein, “The 
goal of this chapter is to facilitate the use of military aviation and associated resources.”50 
Further, USNORTHCOM is referenced in this chapter.51 
With its long history, the federal civilian wildfire community has utilized strategic 
planning to guide their “… Comprehensive national aviation strategy” as noted in the 
                                                 
46 “Mission,” accessed August 30, 2015, http://www.nwcg.gov/. 
47 Anne-Marie Fennell, Wildland Fire Management: Improvements Needed in Information, 
Collaboration, and Planning to Enhance Federal Fire Aviation Program Success (GAO-13-684) 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2013), 1. 
48 “History,” accessed August 30, 2015, https://www.nifc.gov/aboutNIFC/about_mission.html. 
49 National Interagency Fire Center, Military Use Handbook (Boise, ID: National Interagency Fire 
Center, 2006), 37. The individual chapters in the handbook are labeled Chapter 10—General, Chapter 20—
Resource Ordering Procedures for Military Assets, Chapter 30—NIFC Advance Party, et cetera through 




USDA’s 2006 report titled Comprehensive National Strategy for the Use of Aviation 
Resources in Wildland Fire Management.52 It is interesting to note that while the report 
mentions that it was developed with “state and military partners,” additional recognition 
of military aircraft is limited. The MAFFS aircraft available in the United States are 
included in a table outlining a variety of aircraft types available to civilian wildfire 
agencies, but DOD assets, agreements, or use is not mentioned further.53 
3. Resource Sharing Agreements 
Another area of research contemplated in the literature review considers the many 
different types of agreements established by and between governmental agencies. For 
example, MAAs are regularly addressed in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s 
(DHS) National Response Framework (NRF).54 As noted in the NRF, agreements to 
share resources have been established between local governments, between state 
governments, and between federal government agencies. In general, if an arrangement to 
share resources can be beneficial to both parties, a wide variety of agreements can be 
established between combinations of eligible governmental entities. Legal review of any 
agreement is appropriate and necessary prior to governmental agencies entering into an 
agreement. 
One example of a resource sharing agreement is a “state-to-state” agreement 
established to share resources during a disaster, known as the EMAC. Bruce Lindsay, in a 
2008 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, states, “The Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a congressionally ratified interstate mutual 
                                                 
52 United States Department of Agriculture, Comprehensive National Strategy for the Use of Aviation 
Resources in Wildland Fire Management (Washington, DC: United States Department of Agriculture, 
2006), 4. The document states that, “It provides long term strategic direction for how federal aviation 
resources, in an interagency manner, will be procured, operated and managed of (sic) the next 15 to 20 
years.” 
53 Ibid., 2, 7. 
54 United States Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework (Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security, 2013). 
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aid compact that provides a legal structure by which states affected by a catastrophe may 
request emergency assistance from other states.”55 
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has developed a sample federal 
government agreement.56 Although the DOJ’s MOU is a template written specifically for 
grants, numerous elements are applicable to resource-sharing agreements. Included are 
headings. such as “Description of Partner Agencies,” “History of Relationship,” and 
“Roles and Responsibilities,” among others.57 Additional agreements and their contents 
should be reviewed by governmental entities that desire to enter into agreements of any 
type. 
Further examples of written agreements for sharing resources between all levels 
of government are available that require additional research. An interesting and historical 
document in my region, although no longer in use, was the Pikes Peak Multi 
Jurisdictional Disaster Management Coordination and Resource Sharing Plan 
(PPMJRSP). The signatories to the agreement included multiple municipal governments, 
one county government, and four regional DOD installations (one U.S. Army and three 
U.S. Air Force facilities).58 
Regarding agreements involving the DOD and local government, a DOD 
Inspector General Report identifies both pros and cons from the responses to wildfires in 
California during 2007 and 2008. Regarding the use of mutual aid for wildfire response, 
the report states that the DOD may, “Enter into reciprocal fire protection agreements with 
fire organizations maintaining fire protection facilities in and near the vicinity of property 
                                                 
55 Bruce Lindsay, The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC): An Overview (CRS 
Report No. RL 34585) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 1. 
56 United States Department of Justice, Sample Memorandum of Understanding (Washington, DC: 
n.d.). 
57 Ibid. Other headings in this agreement include “Timeline” and “Commitment to Partnership.” 
58 The PPMJRSP agreement is no longer in effect; however, when active it included the cities of 
Colorado Springs and Fountain, Colorado; El Paso County, Colorado; and United States Army Fort Carson, 
United States Air Force Peterson Air Force Base, Schriever Air Force Base, and Cheyenne Mountain Air 
Force Base. 
 17
of the United States.”59 The same DOD Inspector General report, however, states the 
“DOD lacks appropriate plans, guidance, and agreements with local authorities to 
disengage immediate response resources and transfer the support back to civil 
authorities.”60 The DOD Inspector General’s report suggests that improvements to the 
existing systems, for both local governments and the DOD, may be advanced. 
4. Legal Implications 
The civil-military interface is not without legal concerns. Many federal laws 
impact response to disasters. Examples include the Insurrection Act (1807), the Posse 
Comitatus Act (1878), the Economy Act (1932), the Disaster Relief Act (1974), the 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (1988), the National 
Response Framework (2008), and others. 
The Posse Comitatus Act has a significant effect on the military’s ability to 
respond to civilian emergencies. Codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1385, “posse comitatus” as it is 
commonly known, states: 
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized 
by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the 
Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus, or otherwise to execute the laws 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or 
both.61 
Jennifer Elsea, in a CRS report, states that the act has previously been considered and 
approved by Congress during disasters, “Particularly in cases where the armed forces 
provide civilian assistance without becoming directly involved in civilian law 
enforcement.”62 Elsea’s brief statement appears to be applicable to wildfire situations. 
                                                 
59 United States Department of Defense Inspector General, DOD Civil Support during the 2007 and 
2008 California Wildland Fires (D-2010-015) (Arlington, VA: Department of Defense Inspection General, 
2009), 6. 
60 Ibid., 31. 
61 Jennifer K. Elsea, The Posse Comitatus Act and Related Matters: A Sketch (CRS Report No. 
R42669) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), Summary. 
62 Ibid. 
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Next, the Economy Act (31 U.S.C. § 1535) was established in 1932 to permit one 
federal agency to purchase goods and/or services from another federal agency. It is still in 
effect today and arguably has the most impact on the use of military aircraft during 
civilian wildfire events. Specifically, the act outlines four requirements that must be met 
before goods and/or services are provided: 
(1) amounts (funds) are available; (2) the head of the ordering agency or 
unit decides the order is in the best interest of the United States 
Government; (3) the agency or unit to fill the order is able to provide or 
get by contract the ordered goods or services; and (4) the head of the 
agency decides ordered goods or services cannot be provided by contract 
as conveniently or cheaply by a commercial enterprise.63 
Before the USFS can call on the DOD for the assistance of military aircraft during 
civilian wildfire events, these four provisions must be interpreted and applied. 
In 2003, the Economy Act was amended to specifically address wildfires. The 
2003 amendment is titled, “Review and Enhancement of Existing Authorities for Using 
Air Force and Air National Guard Modular Airborne Fire-fighting Systems and Other 
Department of Defense Assets to Fight Wildfires.” The review directed the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) to affirm that, “Assets are available in the most 
expeditious manner to fight wildfires on Federal lands or non-Federal lands at the request 
of a Federal agency or State government.”64 The OMB provided the report as directed in 
May 2004. The report indicated that there did not appear to be any hardships due to the 
Economy Act for the delivery of wildfire suppression. The report did state, though, “That 
the requesting agencies must determine that all commercial aviation resources are fully 
committed before requesting military assistance. This formulation is more stringent than 
what the Economy Act requires.”65 
Another law that affects response to disasters, including wildfires, is the Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (“Stafford Act”) (42 U.S.C. § 
                                                 
63 Money and Finance, 31 U.S.C. § 1535 (1932), 152. 
64 Ibid., 154. 
65 Office of Management and Budget, A Review of Existing Authorities and Procedures for Using 
Military Assets in Fighting Wildfires (Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget, 2004), 1. 
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5121). Established in 1998, the Stafford Act “Authorizes the President to issue major 
disaster, emergency, and fire management declarations, which in turn enable federal 
agencies to provide assistance to state and local governments overwhelmed by 
catastrophes.”66 Prior to a disaster occurring, one provision of the Stafford Act permits 
the President to “Direct the Department of Defense (DOD) to commit resources for 
emergency work essential to preserve life and property in ‘the immediate aftermath of an 
incident’ that may result in the declaration of a major disaster or emergency.”67 In 
addition, specifically regarding wildfire emergencies: 
The Stafford Act authorizes the President to provide fire management 
assistance in the form of grants, equipment, personnel, and supplies to 
supplement the resources of communities when fires on public property or 
on private forests or grasslands threaten destruction that might warrant a 
major disaster declaration.68 
Both “prior to the disaster” authorizations have a direct impact on the response to 
wildfires by civilian and DOD responders. 
5. Canada and Australia 
Both Canada and Australia annually experience significant wildfire events, 
similar to that experienced in the United States. Can the United States, then, learn 
anything from the civil-military interface employed during Canadian and Australian 
wildfires? 
Since 1982, Canada has experienced between 4,000 and 13,000 wildfires annually 
through 2014. During 2002, Canada endured approximately 8,000 wildfires.69 Similarly, 
Australia with its hot and dry climate sustains thousands of bushfires each year. For 2002, 
                                                 
66 Francis X. McCarthy, Federal Stafford Act Disaster Assistance: Presidential Declarations, Eligible 
Activities, and Funding (CRS Report No. RL33053) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 
2011), 1. 
67 Ibid., 9. 
68 Ibid. 
69 “Fires by Year” (graph), May 14, 2014, http://www.ciffc.ca/images/stories/FiresByYears.GIF. 
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Australia reported approximately 6,000 bushfires.70 The Canadian Forest Service (CFS), 
an agency of Natural Resources Canada (NRC), is the organization responsible for 
maintaining the health of Canada’s forests.71 In Australia, the Forestry section of the 
Department of Agriculture is responsible for forest health.72 The use of aircraft during 
wildfires is managed respectively by the Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Centre 
(CIFFC)73 and by the National Aerial Firefighting Centre (NAFC)74 in Australia. 
However, neither the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) nor the Royal Australian Air 
Force (RAAF) provides aircraft directly for wildland firefighting. The RAAF specifically 
states that their force, “Does not maintain the aircraft or equipment for aerial bush fire 
fighting.”75 Both countries’ air forces, however, provide other types of support, such as 
citizen evacuation and the delivery of supplies via aircraft. These acts are undertaken 
with the authority of the civil-military interface in their respective countries. 
The Canadian and Australian systems for deploying military aircraft to civilian 
wildfires and other emergencies are outlined in Appendix B. 
F. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis uses prescriptive research, which is similar to evaluative research in 
which “Evaluative research is concerned with the assessment of policies, programs or 
institutional frameworks.”76 However, prescriptive research “Goes a step further, beyond 
identifying success or performance or outcomes, and actually recommends solutions or 
new ideas. Prescriptive research (also known as normative research), comes up with an 
                                                 
70 “Bushfires,” March 24, 2006, http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Previousproducts/CCB 
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71 “Forests,” accessed March 25, 2015, http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/forests. 
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course, recorded summer 2008, 7:03, https://www.chds.us/coursefiles/research/lectures/research_para 
digms/player.html. 
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assertion, a solution, a proposal for how to address a known problem space.”77 The 
desired outcome of this thesis is to offer alternatives to the current system used for 
deploying military aircraft to civilian wildfires. 
Multiple sources of data were used for this thesis. The primary documents used to 
research this topic are official policy, procedures, doctrine, and directives from various 
agencies. Examples are policies for the deployment of resources that currently reside 
within both the DOD and the USFS. Additional primary documents are existing policies 
and agreements from the various types of intergovernmental agreements78 that provide 
for the sharing of resources. Further sources include governmental reports from research 
organizations, such as the GAO and the CRS,79 after action reports (AAR)80 from 
historical wildfire events, and legal documents, among others. Finally, another primary 
source is information obtained from personal communication with practitioners in the 
field. 
Secondary sources of information for this research include books and other 
similar literature regarding the use of aircraft in wildfires. One example of a book that 
may be relevant to the topic is Wildland Firefighting: Fire Behavior, Tactics, and 
Command81 and its air resources chapter. Most of these types of references are tactical in 
nature, however, and do not reference deployment policies. 
As noted, personal communication contributed to this topic. Discussions with 
experienced practitioners have provided specific information regarding the current 
system for deploying military aircraft to civilian wildfires. For example, the NIFC 
                                                 
77 Wollman, Research Paradigms. 
78 One example of a federal intergovernmental agreement is the Interagency Agreement for the 
Provision of Temporary Support during Wildland Firefighting Operations among the United States 
Department of the Interior, the Unites States Department of Agriculture, and the United States Department 
of Defense. 
79 For example, the GAO’s report Wildland Fire Management: Improvements Needed in Information, 
Collaboration, and Planning to Enhance Federal Fire Aviation Program Success (GAO-13-684) and the 
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80 An example is Russell T. Graham’s Hayman Fire Case Study (General Technical Report RMRS-
GTR-114). 
81 Donald G. Perry, Wildland Firefighting: Fire Behavior, Tactics, and Command (Bellflower, CA: 
Fire Publications, Incorporated, 1990). 
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maintains a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)82 for working with military assets. A 
current staff member provided practical insight into the way the system works within 
existing policy. In addition, information from the public affairs office and MAFFS 
program personnel at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, both experienced in wildfire 
deployments, offered their insight. 
Based on historical review, the current systems in use, and relevant metrics, this 
thesis identifies specific policy recommendations to develop a new approach for 
deploying DOD aircraft to civilian wildfires. These recommendations will have 
implications for the DOD, the USFS, the NWCG, the NIFC, state officials, and local 
responders. 
G. OVERVIEW 
Chapter II reviews recent historical wildfire events in the Pikes Peak region of 
Colorado, specifically focusing on the use of aircraft to suppress those fires. Three 
particular wildfires are reviewed: the Hayman Fire from 2002, the Waldo Canyon Fire 
that burned during 2012, and the Black Forest Fire that occurred in 2013. Each incident 
included the use of civilian and military aircraft to suppress the fires. The timing and use 
of military aircraft, however, were different for each fire. 
Chapter III details the current approach to utilizing aircraft in the suppression of 
wildfire. The current process is analyzed from a variety of perspectives. Existing policies 
and procedures that guide the DOD, the USFS, and the NWCG is presented. Chapter III 
also considers present resource sharing agreements at the federal, state, and local levels. 
MAAs, MOUs, IGAs, and the EMAC are reviewed to demonstrate their efficacy for use 
between local governments and the DOD. Finally, legal requirements that impact the use 
of DOD aircraft during civilian wildfires (essentially, the impact of the civil-military 
interface) are presented. 
Chapter IV suggests options to the way that DOD aircraft are deployed to civilian 
wildfires. One possibility is to leave the system in tact as it exists today. Another 
                                                 
82 “Region II: Defense Coordinating Officer,” accessed February 8, 2015, https://www.fema.gov/site-
page/region-iii-news/defense-coordinating-officer. 
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possibility is to eliminate the use of military aircraft in responding to civilian wildfires. 
Opportunities for improving the current system are also available. In addition, this 
chapter reviews the pros and cons of the options identified as a result of this research. 
Chapter V provides the conclusions that have developed because of this research. 
Included is a brief analysis of the current and suggested systems. The chapter concludes 
with recommendations for improving the deployment of military aircraft to civilian 
wildfire and suggestions for future research. 
Appendix A presents the history and current use of both civilian and military 
aircraft in the suppression of wildfires, including a review of fixed wing and rotor wing 
suppression capabilities and effectiveness, training, and guidelines for the use of aircraft 
during wildfires, and aircraft safety. 
Finally, Appendix B is a brief comparative analysis of the civil-military interface 
employed during wildfires by both Canada and Australia. The extensive wildfire 
experiences from these two countries provide insight into possible research opportunities 
for the U.S. system of deploying DOD aircraft to civilian wildfires. 
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II. WILDFIRE AND AIRCRAFT CASE STUDIES 
Wildfires are a fact of life in the United States and other countries. The Pikes 
Peak region of Colorado has experienced catastrophic wildfires. Three specific examples 
from south central Colorado are the Hayman Fire, the Waldo Canyon Fire, and the Black 
Forest Fire. In addition to USFS and commercially contracted helicopters and air tankers, 
military aircraft were also used to suppress these fires. However, military aircraft were 
deployed at different times and by different methods. These case studies describe the 
current system for how DOD aircraft are deployed to civilian wildfires and demonstrate 
how this system can and should be improved. 
A. HAYMAN FIRE—2002 
The largest fire in Colorado history83 and what came to be known as the Hayman 
Fire was first reported on Saturday, June 8, 2002 at approximately 5 p.m.84 The fire was 
ignited by a USFS employee who asserted that she had burned a letter regarding a 
personal relationship in a campfire ring, accidently starting the fire, six miles northwest 
of Lake George, Colorado, in Park County.85 Lake George is approximately 40 miles 
northwest of Colorado Springs and 100 miles southwest of Denver in south central 
Colorado. 
By the time the fire was under control on June 28, 2002, the fire had burned 
138,114 acres, 132 homes, and 466 outbuildings; damaged utility infrastructure including 
watershed, natural gas distribution pipelines, electrical substations, poles, and wires; 
recreation areas; and natural resources (timber). The fire resulted in the evacuation of 
over 5,300 persons.86 In addition, response to the Hayman Fire resulted in the deaths of 
                                                 
83 “Colorado’s Largest Wildfires (Burn Area),” June 25, 2012, http://www.denverpost.com/ci_209341 
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84 Graham, ed. Hayman Fire Case Study, 4. 
85 John Ingold, “Decade after Hayman Fire, Questions Linger about Fire’s Start,” The Denver Post, 
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86 “Hayman Fire: Hayman, Colorado (Case Study),” accessed August 22, 2015, https://www.planning. 
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six persons. One resident died due to an asthma attack when exposed to smoke conditions 
and five firefighters were killed in a traffic accident while traveling from Oregon to fight 
the fire.87 
The fire was ultimately extinguished on July 18, 2002, 41 days after it was first 
reported. The cost to suppress the fire, including the use of aircraft, was approximately 
$39,100,000.88 The total economic impact of the Hayman Fire including property value 
loss, lost retail and recreational business, lost productivity, and increased water treatment 
costs, is difficult to assess. The Hayman Fire Case Study reports that, “Clearly, fully 
characterizing all of the monetary and nonmonetary impacts from the Hayman Fire 
especially in advance of when they occur will be difficult.”89 
Although a variety of aircraft were used in the suppression of the Hayman Fire, 
including both fixed wing air tankers and helicopters, some citizens criticized the lack of 
response from the DOD. Their concern was that military aircraft were not requested soon 
enough, especially given their proximity to the fire. C-130 aircraft equipped with MAFFS 
were available from PAFB, Colorado while helicopters were available from Fort Carson, 
Colorado, both located near Colorado Springs and approximately 50 miles away from the 
origin of the fire. The first military aircraft, two C-130 aircraft equipped with MAFFS 
from the 302nd AW at PAFB, did not arrive until June 14, six days after the fire started.90 
During the Hayman Fire, MAFFS equipped military aircraft flew a total of 22 hours and 
dropped 113,000 gallons of retardant.91 Military helicopters did not respond to the 
Hayman Fire. 
USFS-owned and commercially contracted helicopters responded to the Hayman 
Fire on June 8, the day the fire was reported, including one Type I helicopter and one 
Type III helicopter. However, they were moved from the Hayman Fire to other fires in 
                                                 
87 “Hayman Fire: Hayman, Colorado (Case Study).” 
88 Graham, ed. Hayman Fire Case Study, 315. 
89 Ibid., 315–316. 
90 R. Scott Rappold, “10 Years Later: A Timeline of the Hayman Fire,” The Gazette, June 1, 2012, 
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91 Graham, ed. Hayman Fire Case Study, 133. 
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the area from June 9 through June 11. On June 12, helicopters returning to the Hayman 
Fire included five Type I and one Type III helicopters. At its peak, helicopter operations 
on the Hayman Fire included 14 Type I helicopters, three Type II helicopters, and five 
Type III helicopters.92 These helicopters were used to drop water, firefighting foam, and 
fire retardant; to transport personnel and cargo; to conduct reconnaissance; and to provide 
infrared and global positioning system (GPS) mapping.93 As noted, however, none of the 
helicopters were from the DOD. 
Fixed wing air tankers also responded to the Hayman Fire. On June 9, two air 
tankers were assigned to the Hayman Fire. The report does not specify what “type” air 
tanker(s) responded; just that tankers were assigned.94 The largest number of air tankers 
that responded was twelve.95 Like the helicopters, air tankers were also diverted to other 
incidents. The Hayman Fire Case Study reports, “On several occasions during the 
Hayman Fire air tankers were diverted to the Missionary Ridge Fire.”96 Further, 
commercial air tankers were grounded on June 18, “Due to a mandatory stand-down 
following the crash of a C-130 air tanker” at a fire in Nevada. The C-130 that crashed 
was not a military tanker. USFS air tankers resumed flying on June 19. MAFFS equipped 
military air tankers were available on June 18.97 
B. WALDO CANYON FIRE—2012 
The Waldo Canyon Fire was reported on Saturday, June 23, 2012 at 
approximately noon and was reported to be fully contained on July 10, 2012. “The fire 
                                                 
92 Graham, ed. Hayman Fire Case Study, 175. 
93 Ibid., 133. 
94 National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Glossary of Wildland Fire Terminology, 178. “Type” refers 
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burned 18,247 acres over 19 days”98 The fire was located, “Approximately three miles 
west of the city of Colorado Springs” “In the Pike National Forest”99 The fire was about 
14 miles from PAFB and around 12 miles from Fort Carson. An estimated 26,000 
persons were evacuated on June 26 when the fire entered the city of Colorado Springs.100 
Two residents lost their lives and 345 homes were destroyed.101 No firefighters were 
killed during the suppression of the Waldo Canyon Fire. As occurred during the Hayman 
Fire and other large wildland fires, infrastructure, such as utilities, watershed, timber, and 
recreation areas, were destroyed. The cost of suppression for the USFS, the city of 
Colorado Springs, and Colorado Springs Utilities, including the use of aircraft, was 
approximately $20,000,000.102 Total economic loss was estimated at $353,000,000.103 
The USFS incident management team (IMT) reports the cost to suppress the 
Waldo Canyon Fire was $15,702,512. Aircraft expenses were approximately 20 percent 
of the total, or $3,204,362.104 A review of the IMT’s incident action plans (IAP) 
identifies the specific aircraft involved in the effort to suppress the Waldo Canyon Fire. 
Aircraft utilized included heavy air tankers including DOD C-130s with MAFFS, SEATs, 
civilian and military helicopters, lead airplanes, and Air Tactical Group Supervisor 
(ATGS) airplanes.105 Lead airplanes fly over the area to guide heavy air tankers while 
ATGS airplanes fly at an elevation much higher than the other aircraft and serve as an 
“airborne air mission coordination platform.”106 Throughout the course of the fire, a total 
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of six Type I helicopters were used (one was a military helicopter from the Colorado Air 
National Guard (COANG) located at Buckley Air Force Base (BAFB) in Aurora, 
Colorado), three Type II helicopters, three Type III helicopters, six heavy air tankers, 
three DOD C-130s with MAFFS, three single engine air tankers (SEAT), four lead 
airplanes, and three ATGSs.107 During the Waldo Canyon Fire, helicopters flew a total of 
280.4 flight hours, and dropped 920,119 gallons of water and 153,258 gallons of fire 
retardant. Air tankers (heavy air tankers, SEATs, and MAFFs) flew 305.1 hours, and 
dropped 320,214 gallons of fire retardant.108 Regarding this effort, the USFS Waldo 
Canyon Fire Review stated, “As expected, there was a heavy emphasis on tactical air 
support from fixed and rotor-wing aircraft, particularly in the WUI but also to support 
perimeter control operations.”109 
Similar to the crash of a privately operated C-130 in Nevada that occurred during 
the Hayman Fire, DOD aircraft fighting the Waldo Canyon Fire were grounded due to the 
crash of a C-130 air tanker equipped with MAFFS that occurred on a wildfire in South 
Dakota.110 
The DOD was engaged in the Waldo Canyon Fire faster than during the Hayman 
Fire. The city of Woodland Park, Colorado in its AAR, reports on June 25, 2012 
(Monday) at 8 a.m. to “Expect Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System (MAFFS) 
tomorrow (June 26).” In addition, the same report states during a briefing from the Teller 
County Sheriff’s Office (TCSO) at 7:05 p.m. that there are “4 MAFFS on Eagle Lake 
Camp.”111 Eagle Lake Camp, a remote site owned and operated by a non-profit 
organization, is located west of its headquarters operation in Colorado Springs. The camp 
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is wholly within the Pike National Forest and is located in the mountains some six miles 
west of the Colorado Springs city limits. IAPs from the Waldo Canyon Fire documents 
that USFS owned and contracted helicopters and air tankers were involved in fire 
suppression on June 25.112 Military aircraft were engaged in the Waldo Canyon Fire 
within three days from the start of the fire. 
The timeline from the Waldo Canyon Fire contrasts with the Hayman Fire, in 
which DOD aircraft did not arrive to the incident until six days after the fire started. Still, 
in a USFS review of the Waldo Canyon Fire, an area to be “enhanced” is the role and 
utilization of military assets. The report states, 
There was confusion by the public over the use and role of the military in 
assisting the incident. This can be enhanced by developing agreements 
between the agencies to define expectations and in sharing the terms of 
these agreements with the public.113 
C. BLACK FOREST FIRE—2013 
The Black Forest Fire, located in El Paso County, Colorado just north of the city 
of Colorado Springs, started on June 11, 2013, at approximately 1 p.m. and was “100 
percent contained” on June 20, 2013. The Black Forest Fire burned 14,280 acres, resulted 
in the evacuation of approximately 38,000 people, burned 489 homes and 196 detached 
garages/outbuildings, and resulted in the death of two residents.114 Recreation areas, 
utilities infrastructure, and natural resources were destroyed, as occurred during the 
Hayman and Waldo Canyon Fires. The El Paso County Sheriff’s Office (EPSO) Black 
Forest Fire After Action Report/Improvement Plan states, “The following shows an 
overall cost associated with the incident: aircraft 20 percent, equipment 29 percent, crews 
15 percent, and fire support personnel were 23 percent. Total cost for the incident as of 
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June 20, 2013 was $9,829,056.”115 The cost specifically for aircraft at the Black Forest 
Fire was $1,603,354.116 The report also indicates that the total market value loss was 
$116,308,348.117 No firefighter fatalities occurred as a result of the Black Forest Fire. 
The Black Forest Fire was immediately adjacent to the city limits of Colorado 
SpringsCSFD resources were dispatched to a report of smoke and a possible wildland fire 
at virtually the same time that Black Forest Fire Rescue (BFFR), the authority having 
jurisdiction, was responding. 
BFFR resources were quickly overwhelmed and assistance from multiple partner 
agencies was requested very early during the incident, including from the state of 
Colorado and the USFS. USFS (owned and/or contracted) helicopters and fixed wing air 
tankers were requested and responded. Eventually, helicopters, SEATs, heavy air tankers, 
and a DC-10 very large air tanker (VLAT) responded to the Black Forest Fire.118  
In addition to mutual aid from local agencies, the DOD also quickly responded. 
Helicopters from the United States Army’s (USA’s) Fort Carson, located on the south 
side of Colorado Springs, were at the fire approximately six hours after the fire began.119 
USA helicopters were eventually supported by other DOD aircraft at the Black Forest 
Fire, including Colorado Army National Guard (COARNG) helicopters and MAFFS 
units from the United States Air Force (USAF) at PAFB. Both active duty units and 
reserve units flew military aircraft. The complete response included six helicopters from 
Army National Guard units in Colorado, Nebraska, and Wyoming; four helicopters from 
the USA’s 4th Infantry Division (ID)/4th Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB); and two C-
130s equipped with MAFFS from the USAF’s 302nd AW. Helicopters from the 4th CAB 
performed 914 water bucket drops that totaled 689,970 gallons of water over 167.7 flight 
                                                 
115 El Paso County, Black Forest Fire after Action Report/Improvement Plan, 46. 
116 Ibid., 27. 
117 Ibid., 5. 
118 Ibid. 
119 “Military Joins Wildfire Fight Must Faster than Last Year,” June 12, 2013, http://denver.cbslocal. 
com/2013/06/12/military-joins-wildfire-fight-much-faster-than-last-year/. 
 32
hours. MAFFS equipped airplanes from the 302nd AW flew 12.1 hours and conducted 14 
drops totaling 37,529 gallons of retardant.120 
DOD aircraft responded to this incident with helicopters and fixed wing aircraft 
on the same afternoon that the fire began. As reported by CBS4 Denver, “Part of the 
federal response to the Black Forest Fire is the huge role the military has played in 
battling the fire” and “The Colorado Army National Guard helicopters have been 
launching from Buckley Air Force Base and heading down to the burn area on a daily 
basis. Military support has played a large role both in the air and on the ground”121 The 
military’s response was conducted via the IRA, which gives commanders at local DOD 
installations the authority to respond to civilian emergencies as long as it does not 
compromise their mission. “The Immediate Response Act brought military resources in 
to play much faster this time around than last year during the Waldo Canyon Fire. It 
allows for support like the C-130s from Peterson Air Force Base.”122 
The more aggressive response to the Waldo Canyon Fire is indicative of a shift in 
federal strategy regarding DOD aircraft being deployed more quickly to wildfires. In 
January 2013, prior to the start of the wildfire season, Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) Administrator Craig Fugate met with USNORTHCOM’s General 
Charles Jacoby to discuss a more rapid response of military assets to all types of civilian 
emergencies, including wildfires. Administrator Fugate’s and General Jacoby’s meeting 
occurred at USNORTHCOM’s headquarters, prior to the start of the 2013 wildfire 
season. General Jacoby stated, “Making specially equipped C-130 cargo aircraft available 
sooner is under discussion as military and civilian officials get ready for the 2013 wildfire 
season.”123 Providing military aircraft sooner was under consideration because, “Under 
current rules, they can’t be called up unless all the civilian and commercial firefighting 
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aircraft are in use or unavailable. Last year’s devastating wildfires across the West 
prompted some civilian officials to question why the C-130s weren’t called in sooner.”124 
The sentiment expressed is reminiscent of concerns expressed both by elected officials 
and citizens after both the Hayman Fire and the Waldo Canyon Fire. 
The discussion between General Jacoby and Administrator Fugate was especially 
relevant to wildfires along the Front Range of Colorado generally, and in south central 
Colorado, specifically. The relevance of Administrator Fugate’s and General Jacoby’s 
discussion to Colorado is due to the MAFFS capabilities of the 302nd AW located at 
PAFB on the east side of Colorado Springs. In addition, the USA’s Fort Carson, home to 
multiple helicopters with the ability to drop water from buckets, is located on the south 
side of Colorado Springs. 
D. CONCLUSION 
These three case studies are representative of the problems with the way that 
military aircraft are deployed to civilian wildfires. At each of the three wildfires, military 
aircraft were utilized, but they arrived in very different time intervals. The time disparity 
is indicative of the miscommunication and confusion that occurs due to existing laws, 
current agency policies, and a misplaced concern for “non-competition” when lives, 
property, infrastructure, and natural resources are at risk. The current system can be 
improved by updating federal laws to reflect the historical evolution of wildfires, by 
evaluating when DOD aircraft are dispatched, and by encouraging local jurisdictions to 
be more proactive in developing formal relationships with neighboring military bases or 
installations. 
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III. CURRENT SYSTEM 
 Wildland fires emerged in full view of our aviation staff, who watched 
them grow as federal firefighters waited for other “approved” aircraft to be 
dispatched from distant locations. I encourage you to do your part by 
directing leadership within your respective agencies to rescind this 
unnecessary and artificial restriction as soon as possible.125 
Governor Steve Bullock, State of Montana 
August 21, 2015 
Waiting for approved aircraft to arrive limits the effectiveness of DOD aircraft 
during civilian wildfire events. As noted by Governor Bullock, restrictions on the use of 
“approved” aircraft extend to the use of military aircraft during civilian wildfires. 
“Approved” aircraft are often more distant than military aircraft. Military aircraft, 
however, are prohibited from responding due to the Economy Act.126 The prohibition to 
utilizing closer military aircraft results in frustration, greater damage to property and 
forested lands, and increased cost for suppression. 
It should be noted that DOD aircraft are routinely used on land that is their 
responsibility. Wildfires are common on military lands where live ammunition and 
ordnance is utilized. The DOD recognizes the responsibility for wildfire on its own and 
adjacent lands with the following direction to its commanders: “For installations with 
burnable acreage or bordered by burnable acreage” to “Plan for and respond to wildland 
fires on installations.”127 The military is responsible for suppressing those fires. One of 
the resources available to attack wildfire on military installations is helicopters with 
buckets. The DOD commonly exercises this routine operation. 
This chapter reviews the current situation regarding the use of military aircraft 
during civilian wildfires from the perspective of existing guidelines and doctrine (both 
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civilian and military), legislative requirements, resource sharing agreements, such as the 
EMAC, and other implications of current policy. 
A. NATIONAL INTERAGENCY FIRE CENTER  
The NIFC is the civilian agency with primary responsibility for coordinating the 
response to wildfire in the United States. The agency’s homepage states, “The National 
Interagency Fire Center (NIFC), located in Boise, Idaho, is the nation’s support center for 
wildland firefighting.”128 Due to the regularity with which the DOD is called upon to 
assist with civilian wildfires, the NIFC has developed a Military Use Handbook.129 
The Military Use Handbook, last updated in July 2006, is a comprehensive 
document with detailed information regarding the use of military assets, including 
aviation equipment. Relevant chapters in the handbook regarding the use of military 
aircraft include Chapter 10, General; Chapter 20, Resource Ordering Procedures for 
Military Assets; Chapter 70, Aviation; and Chapter 100, Incident Business Management. 
Each of these chapters provides direction to civilian management regarding the use of 
DOD aircraft. Supporting the premise of this thesis that the use of military aviation 
equipment for civilian wildfires can and should be streamlined, the first page of the 
Military Use Handbook in Section 10.2 (Overview) states, “Mobilization of military 
assets is a complicated, detailed, and time consuming process.”130 Further, on the same 
page in Section 10.3 (Ordering Requirements and Process), the reader is advised, “Before 
military assets can be mobilized, all civilian resources must be committed either to active 
fires or to initial attack.”131 These statements in a civilian manual caution the reader that 
ordering and using military resources is complex and cumbersome. Reinforcing this idea 
further, during an interview with a MAFFS pilot for this thesis, he suggested that 
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requesting DOD services is like calling an 800-pound gorilla and noted that they come 
with a lot of baggage and a complicated chain of command.132 
DOD Assets: Request/Approval Process for Military Assets, a Microsoft 
PowerPoint© presentation, explains, “NIFC is responsible for providing national 
coordination and logistical support for Federal interagency fire control actions including 
DOD assets” and “NIFC is the liaison between Federal/State agencies and DOD for 
military assistance in suppressing wildfires.”133 The presentation identifies the ordering 
process when military assistance is requested. The following flowchart is applicable to all 




Dispatch Center/Expanded Dispatch 
↓ 
GACC (Geographic Area Coordination Center) 
↓ 




DOD Component Command 
↓ 
Sending Military Installations134 
 
For aircraft with MAFFS capabilities specifically, a FEMA DCO stated in a 
telephone conversation that USNORTHCOM notifies the 1st Air Force (Air Force North) 
who then coordinates with the Air Expeditionary Group (AEG) to identify which MAFFS 
team is on-call. The MAFFS units are on-call for a month at a time.135 These basic plans 
are based on the existing process for the request and utilization of military resources, 
including airplanes and helicopters, for assistance in helping suppress civilian wildfires. 
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The NIFC and the NWCG also maintain specific directions for ordering military 
aircraft in other documents. These directions can be found in the National Interagency 
Mobilization Guide,136 often referred to simply as the “Mob Guide.” The Mob Guide has 
a “Mobilization Procedures for Military Assets” section beginning on page 52.137 This 
section has a bulleted list of steps to be taken when requesting military support. The first 
bullet states that when considering the long-term use of military resources, “NICC will 
determine if all available civilian resources have are committed.”138 Another limitation 
regarding military aircraft identified by the Mob Guide is that, “It should be noted that 
military Aviation resources, when compared to civilian resources, are restricted in 
mission capability.”139 Like the Military Use Handbook, the Mob Guide clearly identifies 
the current limitations to the use of DOD aircraft when responding to civilian wildfires. 
Another manual that addresses ordering military aircraft is the Interagency Aerial 
Supervision Guide.140 Chapter 5, Incident Aircraft, references both helicopter and aircraft 
operations. Regarding fixed wing air tankers, “The National Interagency Coordination 
Center (NICC) mobilizes Modular Airborne Firefighting Systems (MAFFS) as a 
reinforcement measure when suitable contract air tankers are not readily available within 
the contiguous 48 states.” For helicopters, the guide says, “Regular military helicopter 
assets may be provided by the Department of Defense when civilian aviation resources are 
depleted.” Consistently throughout all of the referenced civilian manuals, the information 
indicates that military aircraft are not used as an initial response tool and are not accessed 
by civilian authorities until there are no other options. As noted by Governor Bullock’s 
comments, he believes the current system should be changed to remove barriers to 
accessing DOD aircraft. Other state and local officials may have the same belief. 
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B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 
The DOD has established a number of doctrines that are applicable to the use of 
their assets in a civilian setting. DOD doctrine includes direction for the DOD’s own fire 
departments, support to law enforcement programs, assistance to civilian authorities, and 
incorporating the National Guard into civilian support. 
1. Fire and Emergency Services Program 
First, the DOD provides fire protection on its installations for the protection of the 
people and property that work there. DOD Instruction 6055.06, titled DOD Fire and 
Emergency Services (F&ES) Program, states that: 
It is DOD policy to:  
4.3 Prevent and minimize loss of DOD lives and damage to property and 
the environment occurring in periods of peace, war, homeland 
security/defense, military operations other then war, and humanitarian 
operations. 
4.4 When called upon and approved by appropriate authority, make DOD 
F&ES capabilities available to assist civil authorities under mutual aid 
agreement, host nation support agreements and Defense Support of Civil 
Authorities (DSCA).141 
It is clear by this directive that the DOD has the capability and the understanding of the 
need for responding to civilian emergencies. The instruction continues also to identify the 
responsibilities of various DOD leadership positions. Section 5.5.14 directs that: 
The heads of the DOD Components maintaining organized F&ES 
programs shall: Implement procedures to ensure that an installation 
commander may provide aid to the local community under immediate 
response authorities (to save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate 
great property damage),142 
Further, the next section of Instruction 6055.06 identifies the DOD’s recognition 
of its capabilities for responding to civilian wildfires. Section 5.5.15 indicates: 
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Implement procedures to report all requests from the National Interagency 
Fire Center (NIFC), National Incident Coordination Center, and 
subordinate Geographic Area Coordination Centers for certified DOD 
civilian fire fighters to support Type I Incident Management Teams to the 
appropriate supported Combatant Commander.143 
Instruction 6055.06 further continues to define three different means by which the 
installation commander can provide support to civilian authorities: are immediate 
response, mutual aid, and automatic aid. These different mechanisms help leadership 
make decisions regarding assistance within the civil-military interface. The description of 
immediate response is: 
For the purposes of this Instruction, immediate response is any form of 
immediate action taken by a DOD Component or military commander to 
assist civil authorities or the public to save lives, prevent human suffering, 
or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions 
occurring where there has not been any declaration of major disaster or 
emergency by the President, or there is an attack.144 
Mutual aid, then, is defined as, “Reciprocal assistance by emergency services under a 
prearranged agreement or plan,”145 while automatic aid is, “A legally binding agreement 
for the automatic response by installation/base fire departments to prearranged areas 
outside the installation/base and, conversely, an automatic response by the outside 
municipality/government to prearranged areas inside the installation/base.”146 
Within its basic instruction regarding the provision of fire response, DOD 
Instruction 6055.06 (DOD Fire and Emergency Services (F&ES) Program), the military 
directs its personnel to be prepared to support the civilian community in times of need. 
Support to civilians for wildfire response is specifically included. Reference to the NIFC 
is also included in DOD Instruction 6055.06. It is clear by the instruction that local 
installation commanders have the responsibility and authority to act in support of civilian 
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authorities. The same responsibility and authority is extended to those installations with 
aircraft and/or helicopters. 
2. Defense Support of Civil Authorities and Immediate Response 
Authority 
Next, the DOD has codified a directive regarding defense support to civil 
authorities, also known as DSCA, in Directive number 3025.18.147 DOD Directive 
3025.18 very thoroughly outlines the specific responsibilities regarding the provision of 
DSCA. DSCA is defined as: 
Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD 
contract personnel, DOD Component assets, and National Guard Forces 
(when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the 
affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in title 32, U.S.C., 
status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for 
domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic 
activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as 
civil support.148 
The directive further specifies applicability to various DOD components, the 
requirements for the initiation and suspension of IRA, other relevant policies, and 
definitions for various terminologies. 
The DOD has identified that DSCA is applicable to the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) down through “All other organizational entities within the Department of 
Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the ‘DOD Components’).”149 The directive 
specifically identifies the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard when they 
are in Title 32 status. For the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard to be 
deployed via DSCA, the Secretary of Defense must request and receive permission from 
                                                 
147 Under Secretary of Defense (P), Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). DOD Directive 
3025.18 (Washington, DC: Under Secretary of Defense (P)), 2012. 
148 Ibid., 16. 
149 Ibid., 1–2. 
 42
the governors of the impacted states. Specific policies regarding the use of the National 
Guard for DSCA are outlined in DOD Instruction 3025.22.150 
In addition, as addressed in DOD Instruction 6055.06, the IRA is also addressed 
within this directive regarding DSCA. DOD components are expressly authorized to, 
“Have IMMEDIATE RESPONSE AUTHORITY as described in this Directive.”151 
Specifically, the directive states: 
In response to a request for assistance from a civil authority, under 
imminently serious conditions and if time does not permit approval from 
higher authority, DOD officials may provide an immediate response by 
temporarily employing the resources under their control, subject to any 
supplemental direction provided by higher headquarters, to save lives, 
prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage within the 
United States. Immediate response authority does not permit actions that 
would subject civilians to the use of military power that is regulatory, 
prescriptive, proscriptive, or compulsory.152 
The directive outlines when IRA must end and military resources should report back to 
their normal duty station and assignments. Generally, the directive compels immediate 
response to terminate when the emergency has passed; when enough private, local, or 
state resources can meet the needs of the situation; or when higher military authority 
directs the end of the response.153 Further, IRA is required to end, “Not later than 72 
hours after the request for assistance was received.”154 The 72-hour time limit may be 
extended upon approval by a higher authority only after formal review.155 A military 
commander’s ability to operate under IRA is very clearly specified. IRA is an avenue for 
civilian authorities to gain the assistance of military assets, specifically aircraft and 
helicopters, to respond to wildfires that are beyond the control of the civilian community 
to control. However, local governments should be prepared for military support to end, 
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“When there are enough private, local, or state resources to meet the needs of the 
situation.”156 Those resources may not be readily available to the local jurisdiction, but 
DOD assets will likely return to their installation. 
Included in DOD Directive 3025.18 are two specific policies that impact the 
response of military aircraft to civilian emergencies, (1) approval for DSCA, and (2) 
reimbursement. First, when IRA is either not possible or beyond the scope of the 
emergency, DSCA can be implemented upon request of an appropriate civilian authority, 
such as a governor. The following guidelines are evaluated prior to DSCA approval being 
granted, and subsequently, to receive payment for services. 
a. DSCA Approval 
Prior to DSCA implementation, the following items must be assessed: 
 Legality (compliance with laws) 
 Lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD Forces) 
 Risk (safety of DOD Forces) 
 Cost (including the source of funding and the effect on the DOD budget) 
 Appropriateness (whether providing the requested support is in the interest 
of the Department) 
 Readiness (impact on the DOD’s ability to perform its other primary 
missions)157 
Within the context of the deployment of military aircraft to civilian wildfires, all six 
items listed above for military evaluation are applicable. Some may question whether 
“lethality” is relevant to the DOD response to wildfires. For wildfires, it is obviously not 
a concern that DOD personnel or equipment would use lethal force. The concern, then, is 
that U.S. citizens may attempt to use force against DOD aircraft. For example, this 
scenario must be considered when responding to wildfires in areas where sovereign 
citizens reside or where illegal drug operations are being protected, among others. 
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From an operational standpoint, when military resources are approved for a 
DSCA mission, they deploy with six operational phases: 
 Phase 0 (Shape)—continuous situational awareness and preparedness 
 Phase 1 (Anticipate)—identification of a potential mission, a no-notice 
event, or when directed by the President of the United States or the 
Secretary of Defense 
 Phase 2 (Respond)—deployment of initial response capabilities 
 Phase 3 (Operate)—DSCA operations commence 
 Phase 4 (Stabilize)—military and civil authorities decide that DOD 
support will scale down 
 Phase 5 (Transition)—redeployment of DOD forces to their respective 
commands158 
It should be noted that DSCA mission success is defined to have occurred, “When DOD 
forces have transitioned all operations back to civil authorities.”159 
b. Reimbursement 
Reimbursement, and especially the notion that military assets will not “compete” 
with resources from other federal agencies and/or contracted equipment, results in the 
most significant barrier to deploying military aircraft to civilian wildfires. Cost 
reimbursement is an important element regarding DSCA for the response of military 
aircraft to civilian wildfires. 3025.18 (4) (d) states, among other specifics, “All requests 
for DSCA shall be written, and shall include a commitment to reimburse the Department 
of Defense in accordance with sections 5121, et seq, of Reference (f) (also known as ‘The 
Stafford Act’), section 1535 of title 31, U.S.C. (also known as ‘The Economy Act’).”160 
Cost recovery is also applicable to and required of National Guard Bureau (NGB) 
assets when they are providing DSCA. The Use of the National Guard for Defense 
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Support of Civil Authorities, DOD Instruction 3025.22 (3) (f) (2) specifically states that 
the National Guard will not be approved for a DSCA mission “Unless the Secretary of 
Defense has approved a reimbursable request for DOD assistance from that federal 
department or agency.”161 The use of the National Guard is explored further in a later 
section of this chapter. 
The DOD, in partnership with the DOI and the USDA, has also signed the 
Interagency Agreement for the Provision of Temporary Support During Wildland 
Firefighting Operations. This agreement, first established in June 1975, outlines the use 
of military assets during civilian wildfires through its purpose statement. The purpose 
statement reads: 
The purpose of this Interagency Agreement is to establish the general 
guidelines, terms and conditions under which NIFC will request and DOD 
will provide temporary support to NIFC in wildland fire emergencies 
occurring within any State, U.S. Territory or Possession, or the District of 
Columbia, including fires on State and private lands.162 
As noted previously, reimbursement of costs to use DOD assets is an essential 
requirement for the response of military aircraft to civilian wildfires. As such, the 
purpose statement concludes with: 
It is also intended to provide the basis for reimbursement of DOD 
expenditures under the Economy Act (31 U.S.C §§ 1535–36) for goods 
and services provided through the NIFC to the various firefighting 
agencies for response to wildland fire emergencies.163 
Within the “Terms of Agreement,” item C. states, “This Agreement, does not 
supersede or modify existing mutual aid agreements, assistance agreements, Memoranda 
of Understanding, or other contract procedures between individual DOD installations and 
local communities.”164 The agreement recognizes the importance of local mutual aid and 
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automatic aid agreements referenced earlier in this chapter. Local agreements will be 
reviewed in a later section. 
Up until 2006, the interagency agreement between the DOD, DOI, and USDA, 
specified in the “Responsibilities” section that NIFC would, “Ensure that all available or 
suitable civilian resources have been committed, and the requested support is not in 
competition with private enterprise.”165 That very specific language was replaced with 
the following, “Ensure that request for utilization of DOD aviation or other assets will be 
reviewed and compliant with the Economy Act of June 30, 1932, as amended (31 U.S.C. 
§§ 1535, 1536), the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), and any other applicable 
laws and regulations, as appropriate.”166 The current version of the interagency 
agreement, signed in 2010, and in effect through the end of 2015, also incorporates this 
language.167 
Although it may appear that the newer wording is more conducive to the 
acquisition of DOD assets for fighting civilian wildfires, one MAFFS pilot has opined 
that the Economy Act’s guidance is too vague and results in confusion regarding how to 
define that the requirements have been met.168 
C. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In addition to the doctrine established in both the civilian wildfire community and 
the DOD, multiple legal considerations impact the use of military aircraft at civilian 
wildfires. Relevant federal laws include the Economy Act, the Stafford Act, the 
Insurrection Act, and Posse Comitatus. The laws that appear to have had the most impact 
on the use of DOD aircraft in a civilian environment are the Economy and Stafford Acts. 
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1. The Economy Act 
The Economy Act, established in 1932 before the use of aircraft, was 
contemplated for the suppression of wildfire, directs that: 
The head of an agency or major organizational unit within an agency may 
place an order with a major organizational unit within the same agency or 
another agency for goods or services if (1) amounts are available; (2) the 
head of the ordering agency or unit decides the order is in the best interest 
of the United States Government; (3) the agency or unit to fill the order is 
able to provide or get by contract the ordered goods or services; and (4) 
the head of the agency decides ordered goods or services cannot be 
provided by contract as conveniently or cheaply by a commercial 
enterprise.169 
The MAFFS pilot’s point about the baggage-laden 800-pound gorilla is well-taken in 
light of the language of this federal law. It can be construed as vague and potentially 
confusing for decision makers, both civilian and military, who are trying to comply with 
the law while providing for the safety of citizens and the preservation of natural 
resources. Specifically, item number 4 listed in the previous quote is the restriction 
usually referenced when discussing the restriction of military aircraft’s response to 
civilian wildfire. The statement is identified as a “non-compete” restriction such that the 
federal government does not want to be viewed as competing with or taking business 
away from private industry. In his book regarding DSCA, Norman Wade explicitly states, 
“The Economy Act is also the basis for the general rule that DOD will not compete with 
commercial businesses.”170 
The Economy Act is referenced in multiple documents related to the deployment 
of military aircraft to civilian wildfires. Examples of documents in which the Economy 
Act is referenced include the NIFC’s Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation 
Operations, the DOD’s Directive 3025.18 (DSCA), and the DOD’s interagency 
agreement with the DOI and the USDA. These references and others like them serve as a 
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constant reminder to both civilian and military leadership of the tenuous relationship that 
exists regarding the use of military aircraft for civilian wildfires. 
2. The Stafford Act 
Congress adopted the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act, simply known as “the Stafford Act,” in 1988,171 which was preceded by 
the Disaster Relief Act of 1974.172 When the President authorizes emergency, major 
disaster, or fire management declarations, the Stafford Act, “Enable federal agencies to 
provide assistance to state and local governments overwhelmed by catastrophes.”173 
FEMA administers the activities of the Stafford Act. 
The emphasis of the Stafford Act relative to wildfires is on mitigation and 
recovery efforts. The primary purpose of the Stafford Act is to return a community to 
“normal” after an emergency or major disaster, including wildfires.174 However, the act 
also references emergency response activities to wildfires. According to a CRS report by 
McCarthy, “The statute also authorizes the President to provide fire suppression 
assistance to prevent a forest or grassland fire from becoming a major disaster.”175 
Specifically regarding “Fire Management Assistance,” the Stafford Act states: 
The President is authorized to provide assistance, including grants, 
equipment, supplies, and personnel, to any State or local government for 
the mitigation, management, and control of any fire on public or private 
forest land or grassland that threatens such destruction as would constitute 
a major disaster.176 
The Act also provides for the utilization of DOD assets. Section 403 states that governors 
may request that the President authorize the Secretary of Defense to, “Utilize the 
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resources of the Department of Defense for the purpose of performing on public and 
private lands any emergency work which is made necessary by such incident and which 
is essential for the preservation of life and property.”177 
Like the Economy Act, the Stafford Act addresses reimbursement for the use of 
federal resources. Regarding federal assistance, the Stafford Act permits the President to, 
“Direct any Federal agency, with or without reimbursement to save lives, protect property 
and public health and safety, and lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe “178 While the 
DOD is not specifically mentioned in this section of the Stafford Act (Section 502), it is 
presumed that the intent is to include DOD resources within the Stafford Act’s guidance. 
Similar to reimbursement, the Stafford Act addresses the use of contracted 
resources. The USG generally does not wish to compete with or limit private business. 
Regarding the opportunity for private business to be involved in response to emergencies 
or major disasters, the Stafford Act states, “Activities which may be carried out by 
contract or agreement with private organizations, firms, or individuals, preferences shall 
be given to those organizations, firms, and individuals”179 In addition, the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 reinforces the principle that regulates competition with the private 
sector. Congress directs the Secretary of the DHS to “Further the policy of the United 
States to avoid competing commercially with the private sector” and “rely on commercial 
sources to supply the goods and services.”180 
The Stafford Act and the Homeland Security Act, like the Economy Act, include 
limitations that impact the availability of military aircraft to be utilized on civilian 
wildfires. Further, regarding the use of DOD resources, the Stafford Act states, “Such 
emergency work may only be carried out for a period not to exceed 10 days.”181 It is not 
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uncommon for uncontrolled wildfires to burn for extended periods of time far exceeding 
10 days. 
The Stafford Act and the Homeland Security Act invoke policy that results in 
preference for the use of contracted resources. The language in the Stafford Act and the 
Homeland Security Act may contribute to existing confusion regarding the reluctance to 
commit military aircraft to civilian wildfire suppression. 
Probably due to the potential for confusion and delay when requesting military 
assets during civilian wildfires, a review of the Economy Act was directed in November 
2003. In addition to the review of the Economy Act, the Stafford Act was also included in 
the 2003 directive. Titled Review and Enhancement of Existing Authorities for Using Air 
Force and Air National Guard Modular Airborne Fire-Fighting Systems and Other 
Department of Defense Assets to Fight Wildfires, the Director of the OMB was ordered to 
research the efficiency and effectiveness of deploying military assets to wildfires.182 
Specifically, the directive stated, “To ensure that, in accordance with applicable legal 
requirements, such assets are available in the most expeditious manner to fight wildfires 
on Federal lands or non-Federal lands at the request of a Federal agency or State 
government.”183 Further, the amendment asked the Director to study “Any adverse 
impact caused by the restrictions contained in section 1535(a) (4) of title 31, United 
States Code, or caused by the interpretation of such restrictions, on the ability of the 
Forest Service and other Federal agencies to procure such firefighting services,” as well 
as whether DOD assets are being used “To fight wildfires in the most expeditious and 
efficacious way to minimize the risk to public safety.”184 The review was to be 
completed within 120 days.185 The OMB released its report on May 17, 2004. 
The OMB’s report, A Review of Existing Authorities and Procedures for Using 
Military Assets in Fighting Wildfires, in the executive summary states, “Agency guidance 
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appears to have been the source of miscommunication between agency staff and external 
parties” and “This may have led to some confusion within the agencies.”186 The final 
paragraph of the executive summary concludes: 
Based on these and other factors, the OMB Director has determined that 
no changes in the Economy Act or the Stafford Act are necessary to 
ensure that military resources are made available and are used, as 
necessary and appropriate, for wildland firefighting, and that existing 
authorities are being used in a manner consistent with the available 
capabilities of Department of Defense assets to fight wildfires in the most 
expeditious and efficacious way to minimize the risk to public safety. 
While no changes to existing statutory authorities are necessary, certain 
administrative procedures relied upon by the wildland firefighting 
agencies should be clarified to ensure efficiency and effectiveness is not 
inadvertently compromised.187 
The OMB completed its report in 2004; however, not much has changed in the practical 
application of DOD aircraft assigned to civilian wildfires. 
Recommendations from the OMB report do not appear to have been widely 
adopted. The OMB recommended four “agency actions.” One specific recommendation 
from the report involves transferring ownership of the MAFFS technology from the 
USFS to the governor in the states in which they are stationed. The report’s language is, 
“USDA, DOI, and DOD will explore the possibility of transferring or assigning, under 
existing authorities, title of the MAFFS tanks and distribution systems to the relevant 
States.”188 The states are California, Colorado, North Carolina, and Wyoming. The 
transfer of MAFFS equipment, however, has not occurred, as the MAFFS units are still 
owned by the USFS. 
A second recommendation from the OMB report that does not seem to have been 
completed is to clarify the language of the National Mobilization Guide, the Military Use 
Handbook, and the MAFFS Operations Guide, “To improve transparency and prevent 
                                                 
186 Office of Management and Budget, A Review of Existing Authorities and Procedures for Using 
Military Assets in Fighting Wildfires, 1. 
187 Ibid. 
188 Ibid., 14. 
 52
any possible miscommunication.”189 The current wording in the documents, as 
previously noted, appears to discourage the use of military aircraft rather than encourage 
the use of military aircraft. 
Another action step from the OMB report that might help the current situation is 
to “Enhance training of select Federal, military, National Guard, and State personnel on 
the requirements, appropriate interpretation, and implementation of the Economy 
Act.”190 More than 10 years after this report was completed, Montana Governor Bullock 
is still frustrated by the current situation, and personal communication from a MAFFS 
pilot indicates that the situation could be improved. Work still needs to be completed 
regarding these recommendations from the 2004 OMB report. 
3. The Insurrection Act 
The Insurrection Act was established in 1807 and has as its base the Militia Act of 
1792. The intent of the original law was to suppress revolution. The law states: 
In all cases of insurrection, or obstruction to the laws, either of the United 
States, or of any individual state or territory, where it is lawful for the 
President of the United States to call forth the militia for the purpose of 
suppressing such insurrection, or of causing the laws to be duly executed, 
it shall be lawful for him to employ, for the same purposes, such part of 
the land or naval force of the United States.191 
The Insurrection Act’s primary purpose is to permit the President to enforce U.S. law 
through the military.192 The law does not specify the use of military forces for missions 
other than law enforcement. However, for a brief period of time after Hurricane Katrina 
in 2006, Congress amended the scope of the law specifically to include response of 
federal forces to natural disasters. 
The Insurrection Act was amended in 2006 by adding situations under which the 
President could dispatch the military in support of a state or states. The law previously 
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included the following emergencies: “insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful 
combination, or conspiracy.”193 As amended, the Insurrection Act added “natural 
disasters, epidemics, or other serious public health emergencies, terrorist attacks or 
incidents, or other conditions.”194 Although not specifically defined in the amendment, it 
is possible that natural disasters could be defined to include wildfires. 
The amendment’s intent was to restore law and order after a natural disaster, not 
to provide response capabilities to mitigate the effects of the disaster. The amendment to 
the law was repealed after only two years, and in 2008, the original language of the 
Insurrection Act was restored without the amendment ever having been implemented. 
The question, then, is could the Insurrection Act as amended have been used to improve 
the response of military aircraft to civilian wildfires? It is not likely that the Presidential 
powers of the Insurrection Act would be invoked to deploy aircraft to suppress a civilian 
wildfire. However, invoking the Insurrection Act should be considered if it could 
improve the response of DOD aircraft to civilian wildfires. 
4. Posse Comitatus 
Another legal consideration when deliberating the civil-military interface for the 
use of DOD aircraft for civilian wildfires is the Posse Comitatus Act. Posse Comitatus 
generally works concurrently with the Insurrection Act and is another legal principle 
concerned with the use of military personnel enforcing the laws of the land. Specifically, 
the Posse Comitatus Act states: 
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized 
by the Constitution or Acts of Congress, willfully uses any part of the 
Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the 
laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, 
or both.195 
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Elsea writes in a CRS report that the Posse Comitatus Act, “reflects an American 
tradition that bridles at military involvement in civilian affairs.”196 Elsea further states 
that the act, “rebels against military involvement in civilian affairs.”197 It follows, then, 
that the use of military personnel and equipment used to fight civilian wildfires might be 
called into question. However, “While inquiries may surface in other contexts, such as 
the use of the armed forces to fight forest fires or to provide assistance in the case of 
other natural disasters, Posse Comitatus Act questions arise most often when the armed 
forces assist civilian police.”198 Given this interpretation, along with the exclusion of the 
National Guard from the Posse Comitatus Act when operating as a Title 32 state asset,199 
the use of military aircraft for suppressing wildfire should not be construed as violating 
the intent of the act. Similar to consideration of the Insurrection Act, can the Posse 
Comitatus Act be utilized to support or encourage the use of military aircraft during 
civilian aircraft? It is unlikely that the Posse Comitatus Act would be a barrier for the 
deploying military aircraft to civilian wildfires; however, clarifying this fact may improve 
the responsiveness of deploying DOD equipment to civilian emergencies. 
D. RESOURCE SHARING AGREEMENTS 
“Large-scale wildfires do not respect jurisdictional boundaries. Wildfires, like 
most disasters, require the collaboration of multiple agencies and organizations”200 A 
number of agreements can be utilized for collaborating to share resources, including 
aircraft, during emergencies. Generally speaking, ““intergovernmental agreement” is a 
broad term that refers to any agreement that involves or is made between two or more 
governments to cooperate in some specific way.”201 Examples of intergovernmental 
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agreements include MOU, mutual aid agreements, and automatic aid agreements. 
Although similar in name and purpose, each of these examples attempts to reach the same 
end although via different means. Resource sharing agreements have great versatility, 
assuming the parties can reach a consensus on terms. These agreements are also flexible 
from the standpoint of with whom they are enacted. Agreements may be entered into 
between all types of governmental entities, including between local governments, 
between local and state governments, between local governments and federal entities, and 
so on. This section specifically reviews two existing resource sharing agreements. The 
first is the EMAC (a state-to-state resource sharing agreement) and the second is the 
PPMJRSP (a document guiding the resource sharing relationship between two municipal 
governments, one county government, one USA post, and two USAF bases). 
Relative to the use of DOD aircraft during wildfires, all these various 
arrangements may be utilized by civilian authorities to create partnerships with their 
local, neighboring military installations. However, these agreements do not replace 
existing DOD protocol, such as the IRA or DSCA processes. 
Intergovernmental agreements for resource sharing have a variety of names, such 
as mutual aid agreements, automatic aid agreements, and memoranda of understanding. 
The first type is a mutual aid agreement. A mutual aid agreement is defined as: 
A written agreement between agencies, organizations, or jurisdictions to 
lend assistance across jurisdictional boundaries. It agrees to assist by 
furnishing personnel, equipment, and expertise in a specified manner at a 
requisite time. Prior to the seeking of mutual aid agreement, an agency 
must first commit its own resources.202 
An automatic aid agreement is a “Contractual agreement between two agencies, 
communities or fire districts to assist with the nearest available resource to the incident 
by disregarding the jurisdictional boundaries.”203 Last, a MOU is “A contract used to set 
forth the basic principles and guidelines under which the parties will work together to 
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accomplish their goals.”204 All three of these legal documents may be used for sharing 
resources during emergencies. Two examples of intergovernmental agreements that may 
be applicable to accessing DOD resources are the EMAC and the PPMJRSP. 
“The EMAC is a congressionally ratified interstate mutual aid compact that 
provides a legal structure by which states affected by a catastrophe may request 
emergency assistance from other states.”205 Congressionally ratified as Pub. L. No. 104–
321 in 1996, the EMAC is a mutual aid agreement implemented when a state’s resources 
are overwhelmed and requests help from another state or states. According to Bruce 
Lindsay of the CRS, “EMAC is intended to facilitate fast deployment of specialized 
response units, such as hazardous materials teams, across state lines.”206 The compact has 
been signed by all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto 
Rico, and Guam. The National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) 
administers the EMAC.207 
Lindsay further argues, “EMAC is arguably one of the more important 
instruments for intergovernmental aid.”208 The importance of the EMAC is that the 
legislation provides legal guidance and protections for all of the signatories prior to the 
need for the compact to be implemented. In addition, by signing the EMAC, all states 
acknowledges their obligations for such things as worker’s compensation due to injury or 
death, reimbursement expectations, recognition of licensure and certifications held by 
responding personnel, liability, the states’ responsibilities upon becoming a member of 
the EMAC, and other guidelines.209 Deployment of needed resources can be 
accomplished efficiently and effectively because the signatories have agreed to these and 
other issues prior to the emergency or disaster. 
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One specific area of agreement established by the EMAC is the deployment of 
NGB resources. NEMA reports that it was the intent of Congress to include access to and 
encourage the deployment of the NGB via the agreement. NGB resources include aircraft 
equipped with MAFFS. A GAO report indicates that the EMAC has been activated with 
greater frequency since its inception after including response to wildfires.210 Although 
not specifically stated in the report, it can be construed that these responses to wildfires 
may include the deployment of MAFFS equipped military aircraft, as three of the four 
locations where MAFFS equipment are staged are NGB bases. Further, the agreement’s 
purpose for the NGB is to work in a humanitarian function when crossing state lines 
while expressly prohibiting military actions as per the Posse Comitatus Act.211 
The EMAC is one example of an intergovernmental agreement, in this case for 
state-to state resource sharing, that provides for the use of military personnel and 
equipment, specifically the NGB. The development of this type of agreement may have 
applicability to other levels of government desiring more direct accessibility to DOD 
aircraft for response to civilian wildfires. The EMAC website provides model legislation 
that can be amended (as needed) and adopted by various governmental entities for 
resource sharing.212 
A second example of an intergovernmental agreement is the PPMJRSP. No longer 
in effect, the PPMJRSP was enacted by two municipalities, one county, and three (of the 
five) military installations in the greater Colorado Springs, Colorado region. The 
emphasis of the PPMJRSP was to, “Provide an orderly procedure to coordinate disaster 
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management and share civil-military resources and information.”213 The PPMJRSP 
contemplates the use of the DOD’s IRA within the framework of the agreement. Further, the 
agreement specifically considers the use of fixed and rotor wing aircraft during civilian 
wildfires. 
Whether through this agreement or within the context of the IRA, the PPMJRSP 
addresses one of the concerns regarding the current system for allocating DOD assets-
including aircraft-for response to wildfire. The PPMJRSP states: 
Army and Air Force policy is that leases of military equipment will not be 
made for which a counterpart exists on the commercial market. The loan, 
lease, or use of military equipment is prohibited where the use of military 
equipment would deny the employment of civilians in their regular 
profession.214 
As noted throughout this document, the statement outlined above and in other federal 
doctrine has the potential to stand in the way of rapid deployment of military air assets to 
civilian wildfires. The DOD’s posture, a holdover from the Economy Act of 1932 noted 
previously, is a barrier to the efficient use of military resources when lives and property 
are at stake. Despite this limitation, the PPMJRSP is a representative example of the type 
of resource sharing agreement that can be established between civilian governments and 
neighboring military installations. 
E. NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK 
It might also be argued that the primary document regarding the coordinated 
response to large-scale emergencies or disasters in the United States is the NRF. The 
NRF was most recently updated in 2013.215 In its current iteration, the NRF emphasizes a 
“whole community” approach, which includes direction to “individuals, families, and 
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households; communities; non-governmental organizations; private sector entities; local 
governments; state, tribal, territorial, and insular area governments; and the federal 
government.”216 Given the broadly intended audience, the NRF may be considered the 
nation’s intergovernmental agreement. 
The NRF states, “The NRF describes structures for implementing nationwide 
response policy and operational coordination for all types of domestic incidents.”217 
Wildfires are a domestic incident. It is stated within the NRF, “Natural hazards-including 
hurricanes, earthquakes, wildfires, and floods-present a significant and varied risk across 
the country.”218 Natural and other hazards require that the nation be prepared to respond 
to disasters and emergencies. 
The NRF’s Guiding Principles say, “The priorities of response are to save lives, 
protect property and the environment, stabilize the incident and provide for basic human 
needs.”219 The DHS’s direction is similar to the mission of many organizations outlined 
throughout this thesis, including the DOD and its IRA. Interestingly, although the 
“federal government” is one of the many organizations and is identified as part of the 
NRF’s “whole community,” the DOD and civil-military interface receives only a passing 
mention. The NGB is simply referenced as a state asset that can be called upon to assist 
with “Natural and manmade incidents” and “To support state domestic civil support 
functions and activities.”220 A footnote references the fact that the NGB can be 
“federalized” under U.S.C. Title 10 by the President and placed under the control of the 
DOD.221 
The NRF also states that the President leads the response effort “To ensure that 
the necessary resources are applied quickly and efficiently”222 Regarding the DOD 
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specifically, the NRF’s reference is to the President’s role or the Secretary of Defense’s 
role in authorizing the use of military assets unless the IRA is utilized.223 Very few other 
references to the DOD appear in the NRF. 
The NRF states, “Effective response requires a readiness to act” and “National 
response depends on the ability to act decisively. A forward-leaning posture is imperative 
for incidents that may expand rapidly in size, scope, or complexity, as well as incidents 
that occur without warning.”224 The success of the NRF will necessarily be limited 
without a greater recognition of the potential contribution from the DOD. As written, no 
“forward-leaning posture” by the DOD exists via the NRF. However, the NRF in its 
Executive Summary emphasizes in bold text, “This Framework is always in effect, and 
elements can be implemented at any time.”225 Finally, consistent with other federal 
doctrine, the NRF indicates, “Federal departments and agencies may execute interagency 
or intra-agency reimbursable agreements in accordance with the Economy Act or other 
applicable authorities.”226 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has established that while existing systems for civilian governments 
are available to request military aircraft for suppressing wildfires, the current process is 
cumbersome and confusing. The burden of the existing system puts civilians’ and 
firefighters’ lives at risk and potentially adds to the destruction of personal property, the 
natural resource, and public infrastructure. While the use of aircraft is not the only tool 
needed to suppress wildfires, it is an option that must be made more readily available to 
civilian communities at risk from wildfires. 
NIFC, the DOD, existing laws, and the NRF all impact the response of military 
aircraft to civilian wildfires. The NIFC has processes in place for the utilization of 
military aircraft to assist in the suppression of civilian wildfires. These processes include 
                                                 
223 United States Department of Homeland Security, National Response Framework, 19. 
224 Ibid., 6. 
225 Ibid., i. 
226 Ibid., 29. 
 61
written procedures, a DOD liaison to the NIFC, and an established process for the civilian 
wildfire community to request DOD support. The DOD, then, also has established 
procedures for interfacing with the civilian community during wildfires, recognizing its 
role in response to civilian emergencies with its responsibilities from the DSCA and the 
IRA. Current laws, such as the Economy Act,227 the Stafford Act,228 the Insurrection 
Act,229 and the Posse Comitatus Act,230 limit the ability of the DOD to work with other 
federal agencies and civilian leaders. Finally, the NRF231 outlines nation-wide response 
to emergencies and disasters. However, it does not substantially reference the DOD, 
thereby limiting the capability of other federal agencies and lower levels of government 
to respond to wildfires more efficiently. 
Military aircraft can be dispatched to civilian wildfires. The patchwork of rules 
and regulations, however, make the existing system for dispatching military aircraft 
inefficient. The current rules and regulations can be improved to work together more 
sensibly, which results in military aircraft being dispatched to wildfires sooner, a safer 
response to wildfires, and less property destruction. 
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IV. OPTIONS FOR THE CURRENT SYSTEM  
A system is in place that allows the USFS, state, and local governments to 
request, dispatch, and deploy military aircraft to civilian wildfires. However, this system 
must be updated to improve the efficiency of accessing these aircraft. This chapter 
suggests options to the current system of utilizing aircraft for wildfire suppression. One 
option is simply to maintain the existing system without modification. Another choice is 
to eliminate the use of DOD aircraft for response to civilian wildfires. In addition, this 
chapter suggests three options to improve the current system of utilizing DOD aircraft for 
wildfire suppression: (1) implement the IRA to utilize military aircraft at the same time as 
all other aircraft to civilian wildfires, (2) modify laws that establish barriers, or the 
perception of barriers, to the use of DOD aircraft, and (3) encourage the establishment of 
more resource sharing agreements between local jurisdictions and their neighboring 
military installations. 
It must be understood that the response of DOD aircraft to civilian wildfires is not 
a solution to the civilian wildfire problem in its entirety. Aircraft dropping water or fire 
retardant do not fully suppress wildfires; it only slows the progress of the wildfire. As 
noted by a RAND study regarding the efficacy of large airtankers, “On-the-ground 
firefighters are therefore necessary to secure the fire line created by aviation assets.”232 
Water or fire retardant dropped from aircraft generally only creates conditions in which 
ground resources may be more successful in fully suppressing any remaining fire. It 
cannot be stated enough that the use of aircraft for fire suppression only supports 
firefighters working on the ground. Unfortunately, the public, elected officials, and even 
some firefighters, believe that aircraft are a singular solution to wildfire suppression. This 
belief is not true and must be understood regardless of the possibilities included in this 
chapter. The options outlined in this chapter may, however, help keep wildfires small and 
more manageable. 
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Based on the analysis of the data reviewed regarding the use of military aircraft 
during civilian wildfires, this chapter outlines specific options, including “pros” and 
“cons” for each, with the final three options outlining opportunities for improvements to 
the current system. 
A. MAINTAIN THE EXISTING SYSTEM 
The system could remain the same, as it currently exists. Both civilian and 
military aircraft would continue in the roles and responsibilities presently occupied. 
Laws, policies, doctrine, or procedures would not be changed. The military’s DSCA and 
IRA would continue to be implemented where appropriate. Aircraft owned and 
contracted by federal civilian agencies would continue to be deployed prior to military 
aircraft. While the current system as outlined in this thesis is limited, maintaining the 
current system supports the findings of a 2004 OMB review regarding the use of military 
assets to suppress wildfires. The OMB report recommends that the existing laws that 
regulate the use of military aircraft remain intact without modification. The report does, 
however, make other minor recommendations regarding information sharing, 
communication, and training.233  
1. Pros 
Maintaining the existing system is an attractive option because the people and 
agencies involved are accustomed to and experienced with the arrangement. Maintaining 
the existing system is convenient and easy. No changes are required to existing laws. 
Federal civilian fire agencies, such as the USDA, the DOI, and their component agencies, 
would continue to implement current policies and procedures while also continuing to 
operate under their interagency agreement with the DOD.234 Current DOD directives and 
instructions would not require any modification; existing training and preparedness 
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would continue in their current format. Finally, as noted in the OMB report, the Economy 
and Stafford Acts are effective as written and do not require revision. 
2. Cons 
The limitations to utilizing military aircraft during civilian wildfires as outlined in 
this thesis remain in place. DOD aircraft would not be requested until all civilian wildfire 
aircraft are deployed. Interagency hesitation to request military support continues. 
Critical delays in the assignment of potentially closer military aircraft would endure. 
Confusion from the public regarding the DOD’s roles and responsibilities would continue 
to be voiced. Finally, the conflict between the Economy Act and the DSCA would not be 
resolved. 
B. ELIMINATE THE USE OF DOD AIRCRAFT FOR SUPPRESSION 
DURING CIVILIAN WILDFIRES 
Another option is that the military be eliminated from consideration for the use of 
its aircraft for suppression purposes during civilian wildfires. This approach, while 
seemingly simple, has multiple ramifications. In fact, the option to eliminate the DOD 
from wildfire suppression might be the most controversial, as citizens have come to 
expect that military aircraft will respond to civilian wildfires. The precedent setting 
history of military aircraft responding to civilian wildfires may be too much to overcome 
for this option to be implemented. However, this position has been argued previously. 
Geoffrey Glickstein, in a NPS thesis, suggested that the DOD move its wildfire 
capabilities to a newly created organization that would be known as the United States 
Fire Guard (USFG). He argues that the USFG could be modeled after the U.S. Coast 
Guard (USCG).235 
In addition, it is worth noting that neither Canada nor Australia incorporate their 
respective military’s aircraft in the direct suppression of wildfires. Military aircraft in 
Canada and Australia are only utilized in support roles and are not used for fire 
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suppression. The approach taken by Canada and Australia is outlined in Appendix B and 
may be instructive for the United States.236 
1. Pros 
A benefit to the DOD is that its wildfire responsibilities would be transferred to 
the USFS and other federal agencies. The DOD, then, could divest itself of a mission that 
is not consistent with its national defense mission. In addition, the use of aircraft not 
designed for wildfire suppression would be eliminated. The aircraft that utilize MAFFS 
have less capability and are generally more expensive than comparable civilian air 
tankers. Flying MAFFS-equipped aircraft to assist in wildfire suppression is dangerous. 
By eliminating military aircraft for wildfire suppression use, military personnel would not 
be exposed to flying in hazardous conditions during peacetime. A MAFFS equipped 
DOD aircraft from North Carolina crashed during a wildfire while deployed to South 
Dakota in 2012. Four of the six crewmembers died in the crash.237 Had DOD aircraft not 
been deployed, the accident would have been avoided. Of note, the military would likely 
maintain some aerial firefighting capabilities for fire suppression on its own training 
facilities to address fires that start due to training involving live weapons fire. 
For federal civilian agencies with firefighting responsibilities, the benefit to not 
having the DOD involved is simply less confusion regarding the deployment of aircraft. 
First, NICC procedures would be streamlined with regard to aircraft management and 
deployment. The staff would have less procedural steps to navigate regarding the 
distribution of aircraft for suppression purposes. Second, less coordination would be 
required during incidents. Military aircraft utilize different communications (but have 
access to civilian communication frequencies), require a lead plane (commercial tankers 
qualified in initial attack do not require a lead plan), and have different rules regarding 
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their flight hours (military aircraft are prohibited from night operations).238 The perils of 
mixing civilian and military aircraft in a very dangerous environment would be removed 
if DOD aircraft were not involved in response to civilian wildfires. 
2. Cons 
The first downside to eliminating DOD aircraft from the civilian environment is 
that a capability would be removed from an already stressed system. The military is 
considered a “surge” resource when civilian aircraft are not available.239 The military’s 
surge capability would be eliminated from the arsenal of resources currently available. 
Another negative for the military is that citizens may demand that this service continue to 
be provided, which is especially true when military aircraft are located nearby wildfire 
situations. 
When a wildfire occurs that results in the loss of life, property, infrastructure, and 
natural resources while nearby military aircraft were not deployed, public outcry will put 
pressure on both civilian fire agencies and the military. Citizens may feel less safe and 
betrayed by a system that did not permit the best possible chance for their survival. The 
military has been involved in wildfire suppression since 1973 as directed by Congress.240 
It will be difficult to explain to citizens who have been impacted by fire why a resource 
that has been used for 42 years is no longer available.241 Prior to that time, however, 
military aircraft were not involved in wildfire suppression. The option to eliminate 
military aircraft could be a return to that time. Finally, the DOD has a much greater 
budget than its civilian counterparts. Comparatively, it may appear to be budgetary 
“nitpicking” when a large and well-funded federal agency eliminates a service that it 
arguably can afford. 
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C. UTILIZE DOD AIRCRAFT MORE FREQUENTLY VIA THE IRA 
An option for improving DOD response to civilian wildfires is that military 
aircraft should be considered for immediate use with all other available aircraft.242 The 
existing system requires all civilian aircraft to be engaged in fire suppression before DOD 
assistance can be requested. Oftentimes, military aircraft are available but sit idle for fear 
of “competing” with the private sector. As noted previously, responding to civilian 
wildfires is not the DOD’s primary mission. However, if DOD aircraft were immediately 
considered under the IRA, the closest available and appropriate resource would be 
dispatched. The IRA doctrine of DSCA would not require modification to implement this 
option. 
Dispatching the closest available aircraft to civilian wildfires, regardless of 
whether the aircraft is civilian or military, results in many benefits. For example, the time 
for the aircraft to arrive at the wildfire and begin working may be decreased. Decreasing 
the arrival time of aircraft is important to prevent the wildfire from spreading beyond the 
control of IA resources. Although the cost of aircraft is high, their cost is justified when 
aircraft keep the fire small. The comparison is spending thousands of dollars to prevent 
the fire from extending or millions of dollars to suppress the fire after it is beyond local 
control. 
An example of cost-containment is the state of Colorado’s approach to aircraft 
and wildfire. In 2014, Colorado decided to purchase and contract aircraft for the express 
purpose of responding to wildfires more quickly.243 Given the total cost of recent 
wildfires in the state, the expense of the aircraft to prevent the spread of wildfires was 
determined to be more effective than the total cost of potential fires.244 Colorado made 
                                                 
242 Many of the concepts outlined in this option were developed in a personal conversation with 
Captain Eric Saylors of the Sacramento (CA) Fire Department on January 13, 2015. 
243 Colorado Department of Public Safety, Division of Fire Prevention and Control, Special Report: 
Colorado Firefighting Air Corps, Report to the Governor and General Assembly on Strategies to Enhance 
the State’s Aerial Firefighting Capabilities (Lakewood, CO: Colorado Department of Public Safety, 
Division of Fire Prevention and Control, 2014). 
244 The Hayman Fire of 2002 cost approximately $39,100,000 to suppress while the Waldo Canyon 
Fire of 2012 cost approximately $20,000,000 and the Black Forest Fire of 2013 cost approximately 
$10,000,000. 
 69
the decision to invest in aircraft for wildfire suppression partly because the current 
national system for deploying aircraft was deemed too unreliable and using nearby 
military aircraft too restrictive.245 Having the ability to respond quickly to wildfires is 
supported by both national and state goals. The 2015 Interagency Standards for Fire and 
Fire Aviation Operations states: 
Fires are easier and less expensive to suppress when they are small. When 
the management goal is full suppression, aggressive initial attack is the 
single most important method to ensure the safety of firefighters and the 
public and to limit suppression costs.246 
The state of Colorado supports this philosophy by stating: 
Fast and aggressive initial attack on new fires (for fires where full 
suppression efforts are the appropriate management response) can reduce 
the number of mega fires that may burn hundreds of homes and cost the 
taxpayers tens of millions of dollars in suppression costs.247 
Colorado’s wildfire suppression goal says, “DFPC’s goal for wildfire 
management is to keep all wildfires with values at risk smaller than 100 acres and to 
suppress all fires in Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) areas at less than ten acres, 98 
percent of the time.”248 The option to utilize all aircraft, including DOD airplanes and 
helicopters, is supported by the NWCG’s and the state of Colorado’s goals. 
1. Pros 
The primary benefit to utilizing DOD aircraft in conjunction with all other aircraft 
during civilian wildfires is the decrease in overall costs to suppress wildfires. Although 
utilizing aircraft is expensive, early use of aircraft can keep to total cost to a minimum. In 
fact, the use of aircraft is often the largest expense in the suppression of wildfire. The cost 
of aircraft used to suppress wildfire can vary widely depending on the type of aircraft 
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(helicopter versus airplane) and the capabilities of the aircraft. For example, in 2013, the 
smallest helicopter cost $225 per hour while the largest airplane cost $23,300 per hour.249 
Although the daily cost can be very high, many times it is still less expensive to have the 
fire suppressed sooner, when fewer aircraft are needed, than for the fire to grow and 
require multiple aircraft for multiple operational periods. When fewer aircraft are needed 
because fires are kept small, the entire system can be better coordinated to have more 
aircraft available for fires when they first start, and the total cost to suppress a wildfire is 
decreased. 
The NIFC, through the NICC, organizes and coordinates the response of aircraft 
(and other wildfire resources) to fires throughout the country.250 Providing the NICC the 
standing ability to consider the immediate use of military aircraft for civilian wildfires via 
the IRA increases the pool of aircraft to assign to wildfires. Given the geographic 
distribution of military assets, the availability to consider DOD aircraft would permit the 
NICC to move USFS owned and contracted aircraft to areas distant from military 
installations. Incorporating both civilian and military aircraft in a coverage plan will 
provide the distribution of aircraft to cover more area for the first response. The NICC 
already has maps identifying VLAT bases with a 250-mile nautical range and MAFFS 
bases with a 150-mile nautical range.251 Working in partnership with its regional 
GACCs,252 the NICC could further develop similar maps to coordinate helicopter and air 
tanker kind, type, location, and range. The end result is that the response time to wildfires 
is shorter. Developing maps identifying the nautical ranges of all types of firefighting 
aircraft, while a daunting task, would permit the fire to be attacked from the air before it 
grows too big to quickly contain. 
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Having more aircraft that can respond quickly to support the extinguishment of 
wildfire also results in less destruction to lives, property, infrastructure, and the natural 
resource. Simply stated, less damage occurs. Decreasing overall damage is also less 
expensive. As noted in a 2013 CRS report, wildfires can occur as a “surface fire” 
(needles, leaves, and grasses within approximately one foot of the ground) or a “crown 
fire” (fuels from ground level through the tops, or crowns, or trees).253 The report further 
states that surface fires, “Are relatively easy to control” when contrasted with crown fires 
that, “Are difficult, if not impossible, to control.”254 Deploying aircraft to maintain 
wildfires as surface fires are important to decrease the overall damage caused by 
wildfires. 
2. Cons 
Utilizing DOD assets is not without concern. First, and as noted previously, 
responding to civil emergencies is not the DOD’s primary responsibility. The use of 
military aircraft and crews during civilian wildfires removes equipment and personnel 
from their national defense mission. Gaining support from the DOD to implement a more 
active first response role for its people and equipment may not be well received. 
Next, because civilian support is not the DOD’s primary responsibility, their 
aircraft may not be available when it is needed for a civilian wildfire. Relying on a 
resource that could be unavailable during an emergency is risky. Emergency planners 
must account for the military’s primary mission in their plans and prepare for situations 
that will only involve civilian aircraft. Even though it is unlikely that all military aircraft 
would be unavailable at the same time, planning and coordination of civilian and military 
resources will necessarily be dynamic. Considering workload and coordination of effort, 
the possibility that military aircraft might not be available may make management of the 
system prohibitive for both DOD planners, as well as for personnel at the NICC. 
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Planning for this variability does not include the fact that even with all military 
aircraft available to respond to wildfires, the potential exists that not enough air resources 
may be available during busy fire seasons. Given the lack of USFS aircraft, adding the 
DOD into the equation will help but will not be the final solution. The NICC will still 
have to prioritize requests and triage which fires can be prevented from becoming large 
incidents, as well as which fires have the most values at risk. The NICC and its partner 
dispatch centers regularly triage resources; as such, the skill of resource management is a 
task that will have to be reinforced. 
Finally, involving military aircraft in the same role as all other aircraft may result 
in the perception that government is directly competing with private industry. Private 
aircraft contractors could make a claim that the DOD is taking away its business. This 
concern could be decreased by changing federal law or by adjusting the policies and 
doctrine currently in use. The concern that private contractors might claim unfair 
practices by the federal government is not anticipated as military aircraft are currently 
deployed under the IRA. Complaints from private aircraft operators do not appear to have 
occurred as a result of the military’s role in DSCA, as no complaints were uncovered 
during the research. 
D. UPDATE EXISTING LAWS 
Another option for improving the DOD’s response to civilian wildfires is to 
update existing laws. Two examples of laws found during this research that can be 
improved to enhance the use of military aircraft during civilian wildfires are the 
Economy Act and the Stafford Act.255 Both laws must be modified to encourage, rather 
than discourage, the use of military aircraft to assist in suppressing civilian wildfires. 
The Economy Act was established in 1932 and still influences the way DOD 
aircraft are utilized during civilian wildfires. The Economy Act was enacted prior to the 
use of aircraft, both fixed wing and rotary wing, being used to suppress wildfire and 
needs to be updated to reflect modern realities. The Economy Act was perceived to be a 
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barrier by two persons when discussing the military’s efficiency and effectiveness in 
support of civilian wildfires.256 In addition, the Economy Act does not address 
emergency situations. 
Updating the Economy Act to include reference to emergencies due to wildfires is 
not without precedent. The Act currently includes language regarding emergencies. The 
first reference is in section 322 (General Authority of the Secretary) and references 
“emergency preparedness functions.” The language permits the Secretary of the Treasury 
to authorize the use of agency aircraft in support of law enforcement operations. 
Specifically, this amendment to the Economy Act states:  
The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized in fiscal year 1996 and 
hereafter, to use Treasury Department aircraft, with or without 
reimbursement, to assist bureaus within the Department of the Treasury or 
other Federal agencies, Departments or offices outside of the Department 
of the Treasury to provide emergency law enforcement support to protect 
human life, property, public health, or safety.257 
A similar amendment should be included for the use of other federal agency 
aircraft (such as the USDA, DOI, and DOD) during an emergency. A second example 
that already exists is in section 1344 of the Economy Act concerning transportation 
emergencies. Section 1344 states that funds may be expended when, “Highly unusual 
circumstances present a clear and present danger, that an emergency exists, or that other 
compelling operational considerations make such transportation essential to the conduct 
of official business.”258 Emergency considerations for law enforcement and for 
transportation provide the precedence for expanding the use of emergency language 
within the Economy Act to include the response of DOD aircraft to civilian wildfires. 
Although the Stafford Act was written expressly for emergency situations, its 
primary limitation in the context of DOD aircraft used during civilian wildfires is that it 
reinforces the Economy Act’s direction of non-competition. In addition, the Act also 
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expressly limits the time period that federal resources, such as the DOD’s assets, may be 
engaged. The Stafford Act does not require major changes but can be addressed with 
minor wording improvements. More importantly, training for those responsible for 
requesting DOD assets via the Stafford Act must be accomplished so that current 
restrictions are more thoroughly understood and applied. 
The Stafford Act states that “preference” should be given to private businesses 
with the capability to deliver a desired service and that emergency work by federal assets 
will be limited to 10 days.259 This chapter’s suggestion for updating existing laws is 
applicable to eliminating the language that preference should be given to private 
providers, especially for specialized items, such as aircraft. In addition, the Stafford Act 
limits the use of DOD resources “For the preservation of life and property for a period 
not to exceed ten days.” The Stafford Act’s language is unnecessarily restrictive and a 
provision to continue the use of DOD assets beyond 10 days when life and property is at 
stake should be established. 
The OMB has previously reviewed the Economy and Stafford Acts for their 
impact to wildfire suppression. Completed in 2004, the OMB report found, “No changes 
in the Economy Act or the Stafford Act are necessary to ensure that military resources are 
made available and are used, as necessary and appropriate, for wildland firefighting “260 
The OMB report did offer four suggestions to enhance the understanding of using DOD 
aircraft during civilian wildfires. However, over 10 years later, those four OMB 
suggestions have not been fully implemented.261 The options suggested in this thesis to 
update both the Economy and Stafford Acts do not support the OMB report’s 
conclusions. The OMB concluded that both the Economy and Stafford Acts are sufficient 
as written when considering the use of DOD aircraft for civilian wildfires. 
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1. Pros 
Updating both the Economy and Stafford Acts will help clarify the conditions 
under which military aircraft can be used to assist with civilian wildfire suppression. One 
benefit is that by adding language to the Economy Act to address emergency situations, 
available and nearby military aircraft could be utilized more quickly. Updating the 
Economy Act would pave the way for language in the Stafford Act to be changed. The 
result is that the closest available resource to the emergency could be dispatched, 
regardless of whether it is civilian or military. Updating the Economy Act to reflect this 
practice would eliminate the confusion regarding when to deploy DOD assets. In 
addition, having the nearest aircraft respond would result in less damage to people, 
property, infrastructure, and natural resources. These issues are addressed in more detail 
later in this chapter. 
Revising the Stafford Act to eliminate the 10-day maximum response would 
provide for extended operations during such long-term emergencies as wildfires. The 10-
day constraint is too restrictive for the use of military aircraft during civilian wildfires. It 
is not uncommon for uncontrolled wildfires to burn for extended periods of time. The 
Hayman Fire, for example, burned for 41 days in 2002 while the Waldo Canyon Fire 
burned for 18 days during 2012. Modifying the Stafford Act as suggested would permit 
military resources to be utilized for the duration of the incident or until the threat to life 
and property concludes. 
Enacting these recommendations will help reduce confusion regarding the 
Economy and Stafford Acts. One of the suggestions from the OMB report states that 
confusion exists among the various agencies that implement the Economy and Stafford 
Acts for wildfire response. According to the report, the USDA, the DOI, and the DOD 
have all agreed to increase training within their agencies for the purpose of refining and 
strengthening processes, improving transparency, and preventing miscommunication.262 
This recommendation, however, has not been implemented; updating both the Economy 
and Stafford Acts to eliminate confusion would help meet the OMB’s suggestion. 
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2. Cons 
The primary difficulty with this option to modify the Economy and Stafford Acts 
is that making changes to any federal law is a difficult and time-consuming process. A 
member of Congress would have to sponsor an amendment to either Act and manage it 
through the process. Further, amendments would need a thorough legal review to ensure 
compliance with other laws and prevent unintended consequences. These difficulties are 
nothing new, however, and can be overcome with justification, patience, and 
perseverance. Indeed, laws are made and amended this way every day in the United 
States.263 
Another challenge concerning updating existing laws is the definition of terms. 
Language must be carefully chosen to develop an amendment that is easily understood by 
all applying the law. For example, the term “emergency” can itself create confusion. 
According to the Stafford Act, emergency is defined as: 
Any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, 
Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and 
capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and 
safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the 
United States.264 
The Stafford Act goes on to define the term “major disaster.” “Major disaster 
means any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind 
driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, 
snowstorm, or drought).”265 Although the definition includes many examples of events 
considered a major disaster, wildfires are not included. Given the increasing expenditures 
to suppress wildfires by the USG, and the USFS specifically, the term “wildfire” should 
be included in the definition of major disasters in the Stafford Act. 
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E. ENCOURAGE GREATER USE OF RESOURCE SHARING 
AGREEMENTS 
Another option to improve response to wildfires is that local governments should 
be encouraged to establish resource-sharing agreements directly with DOD installations 
in their geographic region. The option to create resource-sharing agreements between 
local governments and DOD installations is encouraged by DOD doctrine and is 
permitted to take many forms. Examples of resource sharing agreements, also known as 
intergovernmental agreements, include numerous iterations, such as MOU, mutual aid 
agreements, and automatic aid agreements. Each was reviewed in Chapter III. 
The use of local resource sharing agreements must be beneficial for all parties to 
the agreement. For example, not all military bases or installations have aircraft for 
response to wildfires. Also, agreements between geographically distant entities would be 
unreasonable due to travel time. Although possible, resource-sharing agreements must 
make sense for the local jurisdiction, as well as for the military. These agreements should 
not be “one way” in nature. Each party to the agreement must provide value-added to the 
other jurisdiction. 
Examples of resource sharing agreements reviewed earlier in this thesis are the 
EMAC and the PPRMJRSP. The EMAC and its supporting documents is an example for 
local jurisdictions to follow that desire to enter into an agreement with a DOD post or 
base for the provision of deploying military aircraft to civilian wildfire incidents. The 
PPMJRSP is an example of a local agreement that could be considered for a more 
streamlined, efficient, and effective use of shared resources at the local level, especially 
during a fast-moving wildfire. 
1. Pros 
The use of resource-sharing agreements is beneficial for local jurisdictions 
primarily due to local control. “The ability to provide adequate resources in a timely 
manner will minimize the impact of an incident and prevent additional and unnecessary 
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loss.”266 Cooper’s quote summarizes the impact of effective resource-sharing 
agreements. Both the local governmental and the military can pre-determine the 
expectations, assets, and financial arrangements that each side will bring to the table. 
Resource sharing also results in the development of plans by each partner. Knowing how 
each party to the agreement will respond creates efficiency of effort, increases trust, and 
provides a sense of control. 
Resource-sharing agreements also augment local resources and reduce duplication 
of expensive assets. “One advantage of initiating an inter-local agreement is to provide 
local governments with additional resources and personnel.”267 Shared resources 
agreements result in a better use of taxpayer funds. For example, if a nearby military 
installation has a helicopter capable of dropping water on a wildfire, the local jurisdiction 
can rely on the DOD asset rather than attempting to purchase and maintain identical 
equipment. For many local governments, aircraft is likely beyond their financial ability. 
The local government may be responsible for the cost of the DOD’s deployment 
depending on the terms of the agreement; however, the cost of a single response is less 
expensive than owning and operating a specialized resource infrequently used. 
Financial benefits are also realized with shorter emergency response times due to 
pre-established resource-sharing agreements. With a written agreement in place, 
approvals are prepared prior to an emergency. The end result is a more timely response. 
Ultimately, faster response times are important due to the ability to mitigate the problem 
prior to the situation exceeding local capabilities. Faster response times and faster control 
of the fire results in less danger to human lives, less property damage, preservation of 
natural resources-and less overall cost. 
Finally, resource-sharing agreements allow the parties of the agreement to meet 
each other outside an emergency environment. As noted in the USFS AAR from the 
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Waldo Canyon Fire, “It’s all about relationships.”268 The opportunity to meet under non-
emergency conditions breeds familiarity. Having familiarity with a counterpart increases 
trust and cooperation. When relationship(s) have been established prior to an emergency, 
trust and confidence are improved. The desire is that acquaintance with colleagues helps 
create successful outcomes. Finally, Raymond Gretz, writing in a NPS master’s thesis, 
states that advantages to resource sharing agreements can be summarized with, 
“Decreased response times to emergencies, better working relationships with neighbors, 
and possible cost savings.”269 
2. Cons 
Resource sharing agreements with military installations have downsides. One 
example is that military assets may not be readily available to the local jurisdiction. The 
DOD must be prepared for its primary mission of war fighting. As such, local military 
assets may be unavailable because they are deployed outside the local area for training or 
for a mission. Simply stated, providing support to civilian authorities is not the reason 
that military installations exist. 
Another weakness with resource sharing agreements is that they may be 
expensive. Depending on the negotiated terms of the agreement, the jurisdiction that 
requests assistance may be responsible for reimbursing the DOD for the use of its people 
and equipment. Military assets are not inexpensive. For example, when comparing the 
cost of similar aircraft used for fire suppression, the OMB reports that civilian aircraft 
cost an average of $10,844 per day while military aircraft cost an average of $20,265, 
nearly double.270 Cost must be considered when local jurisdictions contemplate using 
DOD resources. Although the cost of military aircraft may be important to local 
jurisdictions, citizens whose property is at risk are not concerned with cost. 
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Further, local jurisdictions may be viewed as violating existing federal law 
regarding competition with private resources by accessing military aircraft. The federal 
government does not want to compete with private resources that can provide the 
required services. This research did not identify situations in which contractors 
challenged governmental entities at any level for utilizing DOD resources; however, it is 
possible that a challenge from private contractors could be made in the future. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Chapter IV has discussed multiple options for the use of military aircraft in 
civilian firefighting, including no change to the present system, eliminating the use of 
military aircraft during civilian wildfires all together, legislative changes, incorporating 
DOD aircraft with civilian aircraft when making deployment decisions, and increasing 
the use of resource sharing agreements. 
The last three options presented in this chapter may help limit a wildfire’s growth 
through the earlier use of military aircraft. To be effective, however, these suggestions 
must address problems within the existing system. For example, the Economy Act is 
often cited as the reason that DOD aircraft are not dispatched to wildfires until all USFS 
owned or contracted are in use and is frequently referred to as the “non-compete” 
requirement. However, DSCA permits the use of military resources, such as aircraft 
during civilian wildfires, even though the non-compete expectation has not necessarily 
been met. The difference in expectations between the Economy Act and the DSCA is one 
example of a problem within the existing system. Considering the final three options 
presented in this chapter may improve the response of firefighting aircraft to wildfire. 
The primary benefit of the last three options suggested is that wildfires may be 
prevented from becoming crown fires. Wildfires that do not become crown fires are more 
easily controlled. The end result is less damage and less overall cost. While the use of 
aircraft cannot be considered the only tool needed to suppress wildfires, it is an option 
that must be made more readily available to support civilian communities at risk from 
wildfires. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose of this research was to identify inefficiencies with the current system 
of incorporating DOD aircraft in the response to civilian wildfires. Improving access to 
military aircraft during civilian wildfires is necessary according to the USFS AAR of the 
2012 Waldo Canyon Fire in Colorado. The report states, “Items that can be enhanced 
included the role of the military, utilization of military assets, and the utilization of 
MAFFS on the incident.”271 Improvements to the use of military assets are needed 
despite that fact that the USFS and the DOD already have policies, procedures, doctrine, 
and guidance in place for the items described previously. In fact, the 2015 Direction to 
Wildland Fire Leadership memorandum from the Secretary of Agriculture and the 
Secretary of the Interior allude to the need for shared resources. Referencing, 
“Firefighting asset prioritization and allocation decisions,” the Secretaries state, “We 
recognize that additional firefighting resources and assets may be required” for the 
control of wildfires.272 The need for inter-agency cooperation is essential for success in 
the wildfire community and the inefficiencies uncovered during the research for this 
thesis led to the following findings. 
The system in place provides for the deployment of DOD aircraft to civilian 
wildfires; however, it incorporates too many restrictions, is not timely, and is confusing 
to implement. Examples of the restrictions are specific laws and policies. The Economy 
Act273 has been identified as the major limiting factor in the deployment of military 
aircraft to civilian wildfires. The Act includes a non-compete clause that often delays 
requests for military assets to ensure that all civilian aircraft are engaged. Only when all 
civilian aircraft are deployed do the USFS and other federal agencies with wildfire 
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responsibilities consider the use of DOD assets. The Stafford Act274 was established to 
direct the USG’s response to large-scale emergencies. However, two limitations within 
this law must be rectified. The Stafford Act includes the same bias to non-competition 
that the Economy Act references. Both the Economy and Stafford Acts referencing the 
need to limit competition with private resources is problematic when considering 
specialized resources, such as aircraft. In addition, the Stafford Act restricts the time that 
federal resources can be deployed for emergencies to 10 days. In the case of large 
wildfires, the 10-day limitation is too restrictive, as many wildfires last much longer than 
10 days. Examples depict the reality. According to the NWCG website, “InciWeb” on 
October 6, 2015, at least three wildfires had burned for more than 50 days and were still 
burning (the Rough Fire in California, the Tepee Springs Fire in Idaho, and the Grizzly 
Bear Complex in Oregon).275 Regarding the use of a specialized resource, such as 
aircraft, the Economy and Stafford Acts are too restrictive. 
The current system is not timely. As a result of the desire to limit competition 
with private business, in this case aircraft contracted by the USFS and other federal 
agencies, military aircraft are usually requested after the fire has already escaped the 
initial attack (IA) and become a crown fire. As previously noted, these fires are extremely 
difficult to contain and extinguish.276 Utilizing DOD aircraft similarly to civilian first 
responders would activate those resources as soon as a fire is reported. In addition to the 
firefighters on the ground, the nearest air support—sometimes military aircraft—provides 
the best opportunity to maintain the fire as a surface fire where it is easier and often faster 
to extinguish. Fires controlled in a timely manner cost less to fight and free critical 
resources, such as aircraft, to be prepared for the next incident. 
Finally, another concern with the current system is the confusion surrounding the 
multiple laws, regulations, and agreements regarding the use of military aircraft during 
civilian wildfires. Confusion and miscommunication among applicable agencies was 
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cited in a 2004 OMB report,277 and remained almost 10 years later after the Waldo 
Canyon Fire. The first item listed from the USFS Waldo Canyon Fire AAR as a national 
priority in the Lessons Learned/Observations and Recommendations states, “At the 
national level we need clarification of roles and missions when dealing with the military 
and for working together to manage incidents, share resources, etc. Who can call them 
in? Who pays for them? How?”278 Civilian researchers writing in Public Administration 
Review recognize this need and state, “Responding to large wildfires requires actors from 
multiple jurisdictions and multiple levels of government to work collaboratively.”279 
Having clearly established laws, doctrine, procedures, and agreements improves 
collaboration and decreases confusion and miscommunication. 
Another source of confusion is the conflict regarding when the Economy Act is 
applicable versus when IRA is applicable. The Economy Act directs that USG agencies 
not compete with private business. However, the DOD is authorized via the IRA, “To 
save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage.”280 During 
wildfires, DOD commanders who respond under IRA prior to the arrival of available 
civilian aircraft could be in violation of the Economy Act. The conflicting language of 
the Economy Act and IRA should be clarified to eliminate confusion when civilian 
operators and/or military planners are attempting to determine the appropriate resource to 
dispatch to wildfires. The military can and does deploy aircraft to civilian wildfires. 
However, the current system is inefficient and can be improved. 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the findings from this research, the current process for utilizing military 
aircraft during civilian wildfires is cumbersome and confusing. The system, which is 
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based on traditional guidelines from both civilian and military practice, is outdated, 
inefficient, bureaucratic, and unnecessary. Civilian and firefighter lives are risked, 
personal property is destroyed, natural resources are devastated, and public infrastructure 
is endangered. While the use of aircraft cannot be considered the only tool needed to 
suppress wildfire, it is an option that civilian fire managers believe is essential to protect 
civilian communities at risk from wildfire. 
The NIFC has processes in place for the utilization of military aircraft to assist in 
the suppression of civilian wildfires. These processes include written procedures, a DOD 
liaison to the NIFC, and an established process for the civilian wildfire community to 
request DOD support. Due to its use of military assets, including aircraft, the NIFC has 
created a Military Use Handbook281 to guide both civilian and military personnel in the 
intricacies of operating military resources during civilian wildfires. In addition, the NIFC 
has other manuals to guide the use of military resources. These include the National 
Interagency Mobilization Guide282 and the Interagency Aerial Supervision Guide.283 
Unfortunately, most of the instruction provided alludes to the difficulty of requesting 
DOD support, as well as the limitations under which military aircraft operate. Directives 
to utilize all civilian aircraft prior to engaging the DOD is also well entrenched within the 
NIFC’s systems. 
The DOD, then, also has established procedures for interfacing with the civilian 
community during wildfires. DOD fire departments are encouraged to establish mutual 
aid agreements with neighboring jurisdictions, as well as to be prepared to support 
missions for DSCA. DOD instructions also mention by name the NIFC, the NICC, and 
regional GACCs. Most importantly, the DOD recognizes its role in response to civilian 
emergencies with its DSCA responsibilities and the IRA. Both processes provide DOD 
leadership with the ability to respond to emergencies, such as wildfires in the civilian 
arena. The IRA is generally used for short-term incidents while DSCA is a longer-term 
commitment. NGB assets may also be called on when in Title 32 status. Last, 
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reimbursement is always considered and is addressed in military directives. Like the 
NIFC’s systems, the DOD’s systems permit the use of military aircraft during civilian 
wildfires. The problems with the current system lie in the inefficiencies built into the 
processes. 
Current laws, such as the Economy Act,284 the Stafford Act,285 the Insurrection 
Act,286 and the Posse Comitatus Act,287 limit the ability of the DOD to work with other 
federal agencies and civilian leaders. The Economy Act is outdated and needs to be 
rewritten to improve the efficiency with which appropriate assets, in this case military 
aircraft, can be accessed to impact the outcome of a civilian wildfire positively. The 
Stafford Act should be clarified to limit errors in interpreting how it is to be implemented. 
In addition, Congress should reconsider other suggestions made in a 2004 OMB report 
reviewing the Economy and Stafford Acts.288 Although 10 plus years have passed, the 
report and its suggestions are still applicable. The Insurrection Act may be amended to 
specify specific times that the President may take independent action to cause military 
aircraft to become engaged in wildfire suppression. Although amending the Insurrection 
Act may have negative consequences regarding “local control,” such an act may be the 
right thing to do for saving lives and preserving the natural environment. Finally, Posse 
Comitatus is generally not seen as a barrier to deploying military aircraft to civilian 
wildfires. However, its language may be improved to eliminate any doubt regarding the 
wildfire suppression role for military personnel and equipment. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The system for utilizing military aircraft during civilian wildfires can be improved 
from its current format. Based on the findings from the research for this thesis, two 
recommendations are offered. The first recommendation is to coordinate the use of DOD 
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aircraft more closely with civilian aircraft by utilizing the IRA more regularly. The 
second recommendation is to update the Economy and Stafford Acts, two federal laws 
that impede the response of military aircraft to civilian wildfires. 
First, the DOD could be utilized as a “first responder,” considered similar to law 
enforcement officers, firefighters, emergency medical technicians, and wildfire 
technicians, through the IRA. The advantage to this recommendation is that firefighting 
aircraft of any kind are dispatched as soon as a fire is known. Known by many different 
names, the term “location based dispatching” (LBD) is one name for deploying the 
closest appropriate resource to the emergency. Utilizing the military in this manner is one 
way to augment civilian resources. In addition, to mitigate possible concerns regarding 
competition with private resources, the military can and should return to its home base 
upon the arrival of appropriate civilian resources. More closely coordinating the use of 
military and civilian aircraft, based on procedural changes and the expanded use of the 
existing IRA, does not require the amendment of any laws but would result in faster 
response times in the critical early hours of a wildfire to assist in the goal of keeping 
wildfires small. 
The second recommendation is to update the Economy and Stafford Acts. The 
Economy Act has been in effect since 1932 and represents the USG’s long-standing 
desire to provide opportunities to private business. However, the law is written in a broad 
manner, stating specifically that an order for resources with another agency may be 
requested if the, “Ordered goods or services cannot be provided by contract as 
conveniently or cheaply by a commercial enterprise.”289 For many years, this single 
Economy Act sentence has been viewed as a restriction regarding the use of military 
aircraft. Unfortunately, the law does not directly consider specialized resources (such as 
aircraft) or emergency situations. For those times when lives and property are at stake, it 
is reasonable to exempt this requirement for the greater good. In fact, the language from 
the DOD’s IRA could be used as a model to assist in defining “emergency situations.” 
Although modifying this law would probably be an admittedly long process, the 
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Economy Act could be amended to clarify these two items; thereby, improving the ability 
for DOD assets to be engaged more quickly during emergency situations, such as 
wildfires. 
C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis is limited in scope and is not an exhaustive review of all issues 
surrounding the use of military aircraft during civilian wildfires. Opportunities for 
additional research are available. One example is the overall cost of fire suppression and 
efforts to decrease this expenditure. Another example is to expand the DOD’s current 
capabilities for wildfire suppression, including whether an expanded wildfire 
responsibility would impact its national defense mission. Two examples that are not 
directly related to the use of aircraft, but that could lessen the need for aircraft, are related 
to mitigation strategies. First, forest health and mitigation policies could be researched to 
diminish the number of wildfires; thereby, reducing the need for aircraft support. Second, 
laws and/or regulations to decrease further development into the WUI might be a strategy 
to decrease the possibility of wildfires, again decreasing the need for suppression by 
aircraft. Each of these examples are not considered in this thesis but could be topics for 
future study to improve the use of military aircraft further during civilian wildfires. 
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APPENDIX A. THE HISTORY AND USE OF AIRCRAFT FOR 
WILDFIRE 
In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt established the USFS as we know it 
today.290 What has come to be known as the “Big Blowup” occurred in the forests of 
Idaho, Montana, and Washington in 1910, burning more than three million acres within 
two days. The Big Blowup forced the fledgling USFS to reassess its role in forest fire 
suppression. In 1911, the Weeks Act, named for Massachusetts Congressman John 
Weeks, was signed into law by President William Howard Taft. Among other 
requirements, fire protection in the forests was established “Through federal, state, and 
private cooperation.”291 The Weeks Act has also been credited with the establishment of 
a “Framework between the federal government and the states for cooperative firefighting 
(the framework would later include private forest associations and landowners). By 
offering financial incentives to states to fight fires, the Forest Service came to dominate 
and direct what amounted to a national fire policy.”292 As forest firefighting became a 
major element of the USFS, the use of aircraft also developed. 
Experiments began to advance the use of aircraft to assist in wildfire suppression 
efforts early in the 20th century. Ideas to take advantage of the relatively new field of 
aviation for firefighting efforts began 12 years after the first successful airplane flight in 
1903. Early experimenters included the USFS, the Army Air Service, and the Los 
Angeles County Fire Service.293 However, according to the USFS, “The successful 
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combination of technology, personnel, and procedure for direct fire control eluded the 
Forest Service.”294 
A. EARLY EFFORTS 
The use of aircraft to support wildfire suppression was first contemplated during 
World War I. Experiments involving airplanes to detect wildfires from the air were 
conducted over Wisconsin by the USFS at the Trout Lake Headquarters in 1915 but were 
discontinued due to poor weather and communications.295 Fixed wing aircraft were again 
used by the USFS, this time to spot wildfires from the air over California during 1917.296 
The first sustained use of airplanes to detect wildfires occurred above California in 1919 
through a “Cooperative venture” between the USFS and the Army Air Service. This 
“Civilian-military effort” was later expanded to Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and 
Washington.”297 The USFS continued their trials during the 1920s, when dropping water 
and foam was attempted with tin cans, paper bags, and eight-gallon oak beer kegs 
suspended from parachutes.298 
The USFS’s next use of aircraft to support forest fire suppression was attempted 
in the late 1930s by dropping cargo from aircraft to firefighters on the ground. The first 
attempts were simply to drop supplies to the ground in a “free-fall” method. Later, burlap 
sacks and then parachutes were used to drop cargo.299 During 1935, the Aerial Fire 
Control Experimental Project was implemented by the USFS in an effort to learn how to 
drop water and chemicals onto fires. 
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The development of better parachutes for dropping cargo led to “parachute 
jumping” by firefighters into fire areas.300 The parachute jumping program was moved to 
Washington state in 1939 and the “U.S. Fire Service Smokejumper Project” became 
“fully operational” in 1940.301 
Interestingly, from a homeland defense perspective during World War II, the 
Army Airborne’s 555th Parachute Infantry Battalion was trained in “timber jumping and 
firefighting” due to concern for a Japanese “fire balloon” attack on western U.S. forests. 
These personnel were trained using techniques developed by the USFS’s use of airplanes 
for the smokejumper program.302 The partnership between the USFS and the Army is an 
early example of the civil-military interface for wildfire suppression, which 
complemented the USFS and Army Air Service efforts after World War I. 
According to the USFS, “The first recorded water drop in 1930 used a Ford Tri-
Motor airplane and a wooden beer keg filled with water.”303 It was not until 1955 that the 
first “free-flowing water airdrop” was used successfully. On August 13 in California’s 
Mendocino National Forest, “A Boeing Stearman 75 Kaydet dropped 6 loads of water in 
support of ground firefighters. The operation successfully knocked-down the blazing 
fire.”304 Since that time, the USFS has experimented with and used a variety of military 
surplus aircraft for dropping both water and fire retardant to support the suppression of 
wildfires.305 
Regarding the use of helicopters to support wildfire suppression, the USFS and 
the USA worked together to conduct experiments in 1945. In 1946, the Alaska Fire 
Service began to test helicopters during wildfires. These trials considered the use of 
                                                 








helicopters for “Aerial reconnaissance, scouting, and mapping.”306 On August 5, 1947, 
the first recorded operational use of a helicopter to support a wildfire occurred on the 
Bryant Fire in the Angeles National Forest. Two helicopters were used over multiple days 
to deliver firefighters to remote locations, deliver food and other supplies, provide 
mapping, and conduct reconnaissance.307 With the success of those first missions, 
multiple recommendations were made to the Regional Forester, including the 
development of a water-dropping capability.308 
Authors Peter Corley-Smith and David Parker report that the use of water buckets 
to drop water from a helicopter onto wildfire was developed in the early 1960s in British 
Columbia, Canada. Known as a “Monsoon Bucket,” water was dropped through a 45-
gallon barrel with a hole in the bottom. A trap-door was operated by the pilot to release 
the water above the fire.309 The 1960s also saw the California Department of Forestry 
and Fire Protection (now known as CAL FIRE) experimenting with the use of water 
buckets and tanks mounted to helicopters to drop water on wildfires.310 Water buckets for 
dropping water are known colloquially today as “Bambi Buckets®,”311 which is the 
brand name of one of the first mass-produced buckets for dropping water from 
helicopters. 
MAFFS systems were developed in the early 1970s. Congress directed that the 
military build a system to drop retardant from C-130 Hercules aircraft as a result of large 
fires in 1970. The first MAFFS unit “Was operational by late 1973.”312 Since 1973, 
MAFFS have been deployed over 6,700 times and dropped over 18 million gallons of fire 
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retardant through 2003.313 The MAFFS program is a joint effort between the USFS and 
the DOD. The USFS owns the MAFFS units while the DOD provides “The C-130 
aircraft, pilots, and maintenance and support personnel to fly the missions.”314 MAFFS 
units are “portable” and are only loaded into the C-130 airplanes on an “as needed” basis. 
MAFFS units contain six tanks, each carrying 3,000 gallons of retardant. 
According to author Barry Smith, two 18-inch diameter nozzles discharge the retardant 
via compressed air from the back of an open rear cargo ramp. The load is dropped all at 
one time in less than five seconds.315 In 2009, “new generation” MAFFS units were 
deployed that are internally pressurized. Benefits of the “MAFFS II” units include the 
ability to deploy the load when the unit loses pressure, reduces the amount of ground 
support personnel needed to reload the system, and permits more missions to be flown on 
any given day.316 
Regarding the use of MAFFS, Smith reports, “By law, they can only be used 
when all other civilian tanker assets are being used. This is to assure these military units 
don’t take any business from the civilian operators.”317 The Air Force states that 
“MAFFS provide a ‘surge’ capability that can be used to boost wildfire suppression 
efforts when commercial airtankers are fully committed or not readily available.”318 
According to a 2013 GAO report, while MAFFs are approved by the Interagency 
Airtanker Board, they do have some limitations when compared to other air tankers used 
for fire suppression. First, the water or retardant that is dropped is narrower than when 
deployed by aircraft dedicated to wildfire suppression. The narrow distribution of water 
may permit fire to cross the suppression line more easily. Second, the water and retardant 
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from MAFFS units is unable to penetrate dense forest canopies; therefore, it is less 
effective in heavy timber.319 Finally, the large size of the aircraft, like other large air 
tankers, makes it less maneuverable in mountainous locations. Due to these limitations, 
MAFFS are most effective on grass and rangeland areas.320 The limitations of MAFFS 
equipped aircraft is supported by a USAF Reserve pilot who stated during a personal 
interview that C-130 aircraft with MAFFS units had limited capabilities in mountain 
geography and deep canyons. He further stated that the MAFFS equipped aircraft were 
most effective during initial attack (IA) efforts.321 
The USFS and the DOD maintain nine MAFFS units for eight aircraft; one of the 
nine units is maintained as a reserve. Two MAFFS units each are supported at three Air 
National Guard units. The 145th Air Wing (AW) is located in Charlotte, North Carolina 
at the Charlotte Air National Guard Base; the 153rd AW is located in Cheyenne, 
Wyoming at the Cheyenne Air National Guard Base; and the 146th AW is at Channel 
Islands, California at the Channel Islands Air National Guard Station. An Air Force 
Reserve unit maintains the final two units in Colorado Springs, Colorado at the 302nd 
AW at Peterson Air Force Base (PAFB).322 
During previous wildfire seasons, “The military has provided firefighters and 
MAFFS support in several critical fire seasons, including 1989, 1990, 1994, 1996, 1998, 
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2006.”323 MAFFS support only (no firefighters) was 
utilized during the fire seasons of 2007, 2008, 2011, 2013, and 2014. The DOD has 
provided both firefighters and MAFFS during the 2015 wildfire season. The year 2015 is 
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the first time since 2006 that both DOD active duty soldiers and aircraft have been 
deployed.324 
B. CURRENT EFFORTS 
Today, federal, state, and local agencies utilize aircraft in the suppression of 
wildfire. The USFS manages a variety of aircraft, both airplanes and helicopters, via their 
Fire and Aviation Branch. According to a study by AVID, “The U.S. Forest Service 
draws from a supply of airtankers to meet the demand of aviation firefighting support, 
including a fleet of USFS-contracted airtankers and an additional supply, from 
cooperators including state-operated assets, military aircraft, and aircraft through 
international agreement.”325 The GAO reports, “The federal firefighting aircraft fleet 
includes some aircraft that are government owned, but most are obtained through 
contracts with provide industry vendors.” A table in Appendix II of the report indicates 
that the USFS owned and contracted more than 1,350 aircraft for the 2013 wildfire 
season.326 Aircraft are used during wildfire for the following tasks: 
 Deliver equipment and supplies 
 Deploy smokejumpers and rappellers to a fire 
 Transport firefighters 
 Provide reconnaissance of new fires, fire locations, and fire behavior 
 Drop fire retardant or water to slow a fire so firefighters can contain it 
 Ignite prescribed fires327 
Other federal agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the 
National Park Service (NPS), and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) are all 
                                                 
324 Lucy Perkins, “U.S. Army Soldiers Mobilized to Help Suppress Wildfires for First Time Since 
2006,” National Public Radio, August 17, 2015, http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/08/17/432 
622212/u-s-army-soldiers-mobilized-to-help-suppress-wildfires-for-first-time-since-2006. 
325 AVID, LLC, Firefighting Aircraft Study: Final Report (AG-024B-C-12-0006) (Yorktown, VA: 
AVID, 2013), 36. 
326 Fennell, Wildland Fire Management: Improvement Needed in Information, Collaboration, and 
Planning to Enhance Federal Fire Aviation Program Success, 9, 42. 
327 “Fire and Aviation Management—Aviation,” accessed July 26, 2015, http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/ 
aviation/. 
 96
involved with the use of aircraft for fire suppression on federal lands. Like the USFS, 
some of these federal agencies own and operate their own aircraft, as well as contract 
with private companies for fire suppression activities. Finally, all four agencies (USFS, 
BLM, NPS, and USFWS) partner to share resources. 
Some states have developed programs for suppressing wildfires from the air. Two 
examples are California and Colorado. While California has a long history of utilizing 
aircraft in the suppression of wildfires, beginning in the 1960s, Colorado’s program was 
established in 2014. 
1. California 
The state of California has a long history of wildfire. The California Department 
of Forestry and Fire Protection, now known simply as CAL FIRE, was established in 
1855 as the Board of Forestry.328 CAL FIRE historian Mark Thornton reports, “CAL 
FIRE is a State agency responsible for protecting natural resources from fire on land 
designated by the State Board of Forestry as State Responsibility Area (SRA).” Thornton 
also points out that CAL FIRE has two primary themes within its mission. The first is to 
protect merchantable timber from illegal logging activities. The second theme is to 
protect grass, brush, and tree-covered watershed in SRAs from wildland fires.329 In 
addition to its wildland fire responsibilities, CAL FIRE has evolved into an “all-hazards” 
fire agency that provides the full spectrum of emergency response activities in 36 of the 
state’s 58 counties. These services are provided via contracts with local governments. 
Regarding CAL FIRE’s primarily wildfire mission, the organization annually responds to 
over 5,600 wildfires that burn some 172,000 acres.330 
CAL FIRE first began using aircraft for fire suppression in 1954. Agriculture 
spray planes had been modified and were used to suppress brush and grass fires. The 
success of the program led CAL FIRE to begin using converted military aircraft on a 
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contract basis for wildfire suppression in 1958.331 CAL FIRE first used helicopters on a 
contract basis in the mid-1960s. The first agency-owned helicopters were purchased in 
1981.332 
The CAL FIRE aviation program has continually evolved throughout the years, 
utilizing a variety of both fixed wing and rotor wing aircraft. Currently, CAL FIRE 
operates 23 air tankers, 12 helicopters, and 15 air tactical airplanes. Air tactical airplanes 
such as lead planes and Air Tactical Group Supervisors (ATGS) provide coordination 
with the incident commanders on the ground and the aircraft over the wildfire, including 
directing air tankers and helicopters where to drop water and/or fire retardant.333 Today, 
CAL FIRE reports, “From 13 air attack and nine helitack bases located statewide, aircraft 
can reach most fires within 20 minutes.”334 Additional aircraft for fire suppression are 
available to the state of California from private contractors, from the USFS, and from the 
DOD. 
2. Colorado 
The state of Colorado has also long experienced wildfire; however, the state has 
historically relied on the USFS, private contractors, and the DOD for wildfire suppression 
from the air. When compared to California’s long aviation history, Colorado’s state 
experience is in its infancy, beginning in 2014. 
The primary state agency in Colorado for fire training, fire standards, fire 
prevention, and other fire service-related activities is the Colorado Division of Fire 
Prevention and Control (DFPC). The DFPC’s mission statement is “To provide 
leadership and support to Colorado communities in reducing threats to lives, property and 
the environment from fire through fire prevention and code enforcement; wildfire 
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preparedness, response, and management; and the training and certification of 
firefighters.”335 The DFPC’s goal for wildfire management is to “Keep all wildfires with 
values at risk smaller than 100 acres and to suppress all fires in WUI areas at less than ten 
acres, 98 percent of the time.”336 
After the devastating wildfires suffered by Colorado during 2012 and 2013, the 
DFPC was charged by the Colorado legislature in 2014 with taking a lead role in wildfire, 
including the use of aircraft for fire suppression. Colorado Senate Bill 13–245 compelled 
the DPFC to report to the Joint Budget Committee and the General Assembly the efficacy 
of establishing a “Colorado Firefighting Air Corps” (CFAC) with “Strategies to enhance 
the state’s aerial firefighting capabilities.”337 Further, Colorado Revised Statutes (C.R.S.) 
24–33.5-1228 authorized the DFPC to implement aerial firefighting efforts.338 As a result 
of Colorado’s legislative action, the CFAC was stood-up with the following mission 
statement: 
The CFAC Aviation Program provides for safe and efficient aviation 
services to meet DFPC’s wildfire management goal. Utilization of 
technology, sound aviation management practices, and highly trained and 
motivated personnel will reduce risk, loss, waste, and expenditures. The 
key to achieving DFPC’s goal is developing the capability to detect fires 
earlier, locate them faster, provide the local Incident Commander with 
data needed to make informed decisions regarding suppression strategy, 
and then dispatch the appropriate aviation suppression resources 
expeditiously.339 
Civilian and military aircraft have been utilized in Colorado in the past. However, 
unlike CAL FIRE, the DFPC did not directly operate aircraft. As directed by legislation, 
the state of Colorado through its CFAC owns and operates two “multi-mission aircraft” 
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(MMA). According to the CFAC, features of the MMA include (1) real time fire 
intelligence, (2) geospatial product generation, (3) interagency communications, and (4) 
aerial surveillance.340 The MMA does not assist aerial firefighting as an air tactical 
aircraft. For the 2015 fire season, the CFAC contracted three helicopters and two SEATs. 
The CFAC’s helicopter’s and SEAT’s primary responsibilities are to drop water 
or retardant. Helicopter water buckets, depending on the manufacturer, vary in capacity 
from 50 gallons to over 5,000 gallons. CFAC helicopters can drop from 100 to 300 
gallons. According to the NWCG’s Interagency Single Engine Air Tanker Operations 
Guide, SEAT airplanes can deploy from 500 to 800 gallons of fire retardant or water and 
are used primarily for IA.341 IA occurs as early as possible after detection of the wildfire. 
The goal of IA is to prevent the fire from growing and suppressing it while it is still as 
small as possible. The CFAC’s contracted helicopters and SEAT capabilities are used to 
meet the DPFC’s goal for wildfire management during IA. 
Local governments also maintain their own aircraft, in part to provide aerial 
wildfire suppression. One prominent example from a wildfire perspective is Los Angeles 
County in California. The Los Angeles County Fire Department (LACFD) owns and 
operates nine helicopters. In addition, LACFD contracts with privately owned companies 
for both air tankers and additional helicopters with greater capabilities than the 
helicopters that they operate.342 Otherwise, the LACFD’s program for aerial firefighting 
is similar to all other wildland firefighting missions involving aircraft as described 
previously. 
C. AIRCRAFT KIND AND TYPE 
Aircraft used to suppress wildfires are identified by “kind” (fixed wing or rotor 
wing) and “type” (capability). Air tankers (fixed wing) are identified by the following 
capabilities: a Type I air tanker is capable of dropping a minimum of 3,000 gallons of 
                                                 
340 “Multi-Mission Aircraft,” accessed August 23, 2015, http://dfs.state.co.us/programs-2/mma. 
341 National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Interagency Single Engine Air Tanker Operations Guide 
(PMS 506, NFES 001844) (Boise, ID: National Wildfire Coordinating Group, 2014), 28. 
342 “Air Operations,” Los Angeles County Fire Department (Power Point), accessed August 22, 2015, 
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water or fire retardant, a Type II air tanker carries from 1,800 to 2,999 gallons of water or 
fire retardant, and a Type III air tanker has the capacity to carry from 800 to 1,799 
gallons of water or fire retardant.343 SEATs (Type IV) carry a maximum of 800 gallons 
of water or retardant.344 A special category of air tankers are called “Very Large Air 
Tankers” (VLAT). DC-10 aircraft carry 11,900 gallons of water or retardant while 747 
aircraft carry 19,600 gallons of water or retardant.345 DOD C-130 Hercules aircraft 
equipped with MAFFS carry 3,000 gallons of water or retardant and are classified as 
Type I air tankers.346 
Helicopters are also classified by their fire suppression capability, among other 
factors. Type I helicopters are considered “heavy” helicopters and must be able to carry a 
minimum of 700 gallons of water or retardant.347 Type II helicopters are known as 
“medium” helicopters. A Type II helicopter must be capable of carrying a minimum of 
300 gallons of water or retardant.348 “Light” helicopters must be able to carry a minimum 
of 100 gallons or water or retardant and are known as Type III helicopters.349 Helicopters 
that have fixed tanks for water or retardant are known as “helitankers.”350 As noted 
previously, helicopters also drop water from buckets, both rigid buckets and collapsible 
buckets. Collapsible buckets carry from approximately 90 to 2,000 gallons of water while 
rigid buckets are capable of delivering 100 to 3,000 gallons of water.351 
D. AIRCRAFT SAFETY 
Coordinating the use of both civilian and military aircraft is important to complete 
the wildfire suppression mission safely. Having both military and civilian aircraft in the 
                                                 




347 National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Interagency Helicopter Operations Guide (NFES 001885, 
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same airspace is a challenge for the pilots flying in very dangerous conditions. One 
concern is that civilian and military aircraft generally operate on different radio 
frequencies. After the Waldo Canyon Fire in Colorado during 2012, the Incident 
Management Team’s (IMT) narrative summary closeout regarding air operations states: 
The primary Operational issue was incorporating the Military Aircraft into 
our Air Operation. At one point we were conferring with Air National 
Guard, Regular Army, and National Guard. Through a series of 
discussions involving Air Operations and Military personnel a positive 
relationship was established letting military aircraft contribute to the 
suppression effort.352 
Communication issues are also dangerous for firefighters on the ground, as they 
require the ability to communicate with all aircraft. In addition to communication 
concerns, it is essential that airspace coordination be carefully managed to maintain safe 
operations. 
Airspace coordination and flight de-confliction is prescribed by the procedures 
established in the “Interagency Airspace Guidelines”353 through guidance from the 
Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) National Airspace System (NAS)354 and 
Airspace Management Plan for Disasters.355 The NAS was developed to “Protect 
persons and property on the ground, and to establish a safe and efficient airspace 
environment for civil, commercial, and military aviation.”356 The Airspace Management 
Plan for Disasters directs the use of “fire traffic areas” (FTA) and “temporary flight 
restrictions” (TFR) specifically for wildfire events.357 These directions provide flight 
following and other safety requirements as specified in NWCG documents, such as the 
                                                 
352 National Incident Management Team, Great Basin Team 2, Rich Harvey, Incident Commander, 
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National Interagency Mobilization Guide358 and the Interagency Standards for Fire and 
Fire Aviation Operations support aircraft safety.359 
E. AIRCRAFT SUPPORT FOR FIRE SUPPRESSION 
Other federal entities are involved in the use of aircraft for suppression of 
wildfires. These entities do not use or provide aircraft directly, but support the use of 
aircraft in the suppression of wildfires throughout the United States: NWCG, the NIFC, 
and the NICC. 
The NWCG is located in Boise, Idaho. Formed by the USDA and the DOI in 
1976, the mission of the NWCG states: 
The National Wildfire Coordinating Group provides national leadership to 
develop, maintain, and communicate interagency standards, guidelines, 
qualifications, training, and other capabilities that enable interoperable 
operations among federal and non-federal entities. Although NWCG 
standards are interagency by design, the decision to adopt and utilize them 
is made independently by the individual member entities and 
communicated through their respective directives systems.360 
Currently, nine member agencies make up the NWCG.361 
The NIFC is another federal agency partnership located in Boise, Idaho. The 
NIFC also comprises nine federal agencies and organizations.362 The NIFC’s mission is 
to serve as “The nation’s support center for wildland firefighting.” Originally established 
in 1965 as the Boise Interagency Fire Center (BIFC) by the USFS, the BLM, and the 
National Weather Service (NWS), those agencies “Saw the need to work together to 
reduce the duplication of services, cut costs, and coordinate national fire planning and 
                                                 
358 National Interagency Fire Center, National Interagency Mobilization Guide. 
359 National Interagency Fire Center, Interagency Standards for Fire and Fire Aviation Operations. 
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361 The nine member agencies of the NWCG are (alphabetically) the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the 
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of Indian Affairs, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, the Unites States Forest 
Service, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the National Business Center, the United 
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operations.” In 1993, having added additional agencies and organizations, the BIFC 
changed its name to the NIFC “To more accurately reflect its national mission.”363 
The NIFC also assists in the coordination of aircraft for wildfire suppression. The 
NIFC’s roles include support for contracting aircraft for wildfire suppression (contract 
types include both “call when needed” (CWN) and “exclusive use” arrangements); 
testing and qualifying helicopter pilots; and supporting various committees regarding the 
use of aircraft in wildfire. Like the NWCG, the NIFC does not own or operate aircraft for 
fire suppression during wildfires. The NIFC provides support functions to those federal 
(non-DOD) agencies that do operate aircraft.364 
The NICC is another partnership-based federal agency co-located in Boise, Idaho 
with the NIFC. The NICC is an operational unit of the NIFC. The NICC’s mission is to 
serve as “The focal point for overseeing all interagency coordination activities throughout 
the United States.” The NICC website also states: 
Wildfire suppression is built on a three-tiered system of support-the local 
area, one of the 11 geographic areas, and finally, the national level. When 
a fire is reported, the local agency and its firefighting partners respond. If 
the fire continues to grow, the agency can ask for help from its geographic 
area. When a geographic area has exhausted all its resources, it can turn to 
NICC at the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC) for help in locating 
what is needed, from air tankers to radios to firefighting crews to incident 
management teams.365 
The NICC plays an important role in supporting the deployment of aircraft, 
whether civilian or military, to wildfire incidents throughout the United States. Regarding 
military support for wildfire specifically, a DOD liaison officer (LOFR) is assigned to the 
NICC during the fire season. The LOFR is generally assigned from June through October 
every year, although the timeframe varies depending on the severity and length of the 
wildfire season. The position is formally known as the “Military LOFR” at the NICC.366 
                                                 
363 “About NIFC,” accessed August 13, 2015, https://www.nifc.gov/aboutNIFC/about_mission.html. 
364 “Aviation,” accessed August 13, 2015, https://www.nifc.gov/aviation/aviation_main.html. 
365 “About Us,” National Interagency Coordination Center. 
366 O’Brien, FEMA Region 10 Defense Coordinating Element staff member. 
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Training and establishing guidelines for the use of aircraft in the wildfire 
environment is one task performed by federal agencies, such as the NWCG. Among 
approximately two dozen that are available, examples of guides and standards 
promulgated by the NWCG include the National Fire Danger Rating System (NFDRS), 
the Fireline Handbook, and the National Interagency Mobilization Guide.367 Further, the 
NWCG provides standardized training curricula for such things as dispatching, fire 
prevention, leadership, and fire suppression. The 2015 NWCG Publications Catalog 
currently lists approximately 64 individual training classes. More classes are available but 
not listed in the catalog.368 
The NWCG has also developed multiple training courses specifically related to 
aviation. Aviation-based courses include: 
 Aircraft Dispatcher (D-312) 
 Basic Air Operations (S-270) 
 Helicopter Crewmember (S-271) 
 Single Engine Air Tanker Manager (S-273) 
 Helicopter Management (S-372) 
 Air Support Group Supervisor (S-375) 
 Aerial Supervision (S-378)369 
Most NWCG courses refer to air operations, ensuring that all personnel have an 
awareness and understanding of the use of aircraft, whether civilian or military, for fire 
suppression.  
The NWCG’s primary manual, commonly known throughout the wildfire 
community as the “Red Book,” is officially titled the Interagency Standards for Fire and 
Fire Aviation Operations. As indicated in its title, the “Red Book” has one chapter fully 
                                                 
367 National Wildfire Coordinating Group, NWCG National Fire Equipment System, Catalog Part 2: 
Publications 2015 (PMS 449–2) (Boise, ID: National Wildfire Coordinating Group, 2015), 2–3. 
368 Ibid. 
369 National Wildfire Coordinating Group, NWCG National Fire Equipment System, Catalog Part 2: 
Publications 2015, 1–2. 
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devoted to the use of aircraft during wildfires. Chapter 16 is titled “Aviation Operations 
and Resources.”370 
The NWCG also develops many other standards, guides, and directories regarding 
the use of aircraft in fire suppression. Wildfire suppression aviation standards and other 
documents include: 
 Five Steps to a Safe Flight 
 Interagency Aerial Supervision Guide (IASG) 
 Interagency Airtanker Base Directory 
 Interagency Airtanker Base Operations Guide 
 Interagency Aviation Mishap Response Guide and Checklist 
 Interagency Aviation User Pocket Guide 
 Interagency Helicopter Operations Guide (IHOG) 
 Interagency Single Engine Airtanker Operations Guide (ISOG) 
 Twelve Standard Aviation Questions that Shout “Watch Out”!371 
The Incident Response Pocket Guide (IRPG), used by almost all wildland 
firefighters in the United States, devotes 20 pages (of an approximately 120-page guide) 
to aviation references.372 The NWCG and other federal agencies are intimately involved 
with the use of aircraft for wildfire suppression. 
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APPENDIX B. CANADA AND AUSTRALIA 
Like the United States, and indeed, most democratic states, Canada and Australia 
employ military resources within their borders under certain circumstances, usually in the 
context of natural disasters and other emergencies that exceed the ability of the sub-
national governments and their resources to respond safely, effectively, and efficiently. 
Canada and Australia also have a similar version of the U.S. IRA. However, Canada and 
Australia do not utilize military aircraft for wildfire suppression. The United States 
should consider the Canadian and Australian model for whether or not military aircraft 
should be used to assist in wildfire suppression. This appendix reviews the use of aircraft, 
both civilian and military, during wildfires in Canada and Australia. Based on a 
comparison of the policies and practices in those countries, the United Statesmay benefit 
from their experiences regarding the use of military aircraft to suppress wildfires. 
A. CANADA AND AUSTRALIA 
The Canadians and the Australians employ their respective militaries within their 
borders in response to natural disasters, among other purposes. Both the Canadian Armed 
Forces (CAF) and the Australian Defence Forces (ADF) have provisions similar to the 
United Statesfor immediate response. In addition, both the CAF and the ADF deploy 
their assets during large-scale wildfires. What can the United Stateslearn and apply in its 
use of military assets, including aircraft, during civilian wildfires? 
1. Canada 
Approximately 42 percent of Canada, or 348 million hectares (860 million acres), 
is covered by forested lands.373 This sum represents about 4.17 million square 
kilometers374 and is reported to be approximately 10 percent of the world’s forests.375 
Like its neighbor to the south, Canada suppresses numerous wildfires throughout the 
                                                 
373 “Forests,” accessed March 25, 2015, https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/forests. 
374 Blair Watson, “Fighting Wildfires,” Frontline Security 6, no. 2 (Summer 2011): 32. 
375 “Fire,” accessed January 14, 2015, https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/forests/fire/13143. 
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country every year. Natural Resources Canada (NRC) reports that over the past 25 years, 
Canada has experienced some 8,300 wildfires resulting in approximately 2.3 million 
hectares (5,681,000 million acres) burned.376 During the last 10 years, Canada has spent 
from $500 million to $1 billion per year to suppress wildfires.377 
The Canadians also utilize aircraft in the suppression of wildfires. Blaire Watson 
reports that more than 100 aircraft are used for fighting wildfires in Canada.378 Canada’s 
aircraft inventory includes both fixed wing tankers and helicopters. Aircraft for fighting 
wildfire are owned and deployed by provincial governments, as well as contracted for 
wildfire suppression from private owners.379 This arrangement represents a mix of 
firefighting aircraft from public, private, and public-private partnerships.380 Canada also 
reports that its fleet of aircraft is aging with approximately 83 percent greater than 30 
years old while 25 percent are more than 40 years old.381 
The Canadian Interagency Forest Fire Centre (CIFFC) coordinates wildfire 
suppression in Canada. The CIFFC helps to coordinate the use of aircraft during wildfire 
suppression via the Aviation Working Group (AWG). The AWG provides a variety of 
services to the wildfire aviation community. Their goals include safety, regulations, 
training, hiring procedures and standards, operational guidelines, and research and 
development.382 The vision of the CIFFC AWG is “A seamless exchange of fire aviation 
assets across national and international boundaries.”383 
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The CAF includes the Canadian Army, the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), and the 
Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF).384 Similar to the United States, the CAF also 
provides support to civilian missions. The authority for CAF support to civilian 
authorities is the Emergencies Act of 1988, which provides four categories under which 
the military may deploy domestically. The first category is for a “public welfare 
emergency,” which “Involves military support to civil authorities coping with a natural 
disaster.”385 Military missions in Canada to support civilians are organized under 
Contingency Plan LENTUS.386 When activated, “Operation LENTUS is the CAF 
contingency plan that outlines the joint response to provide support for Humanitarian 
Assistance and Disaster Response (HADR) to provincial and territorial authorities in the 
case of a major natural disaster that overwhelms their capacity to respond.”387 Forest 
fires are specifically referenced in Operation LENTUS guidance. The Canadian Joint 
Operations Command (CJOC) manages military operations in the civilian environment. 
When a province is overwhelmed by a natural disaster, including wildfires, the 
provincial government makes a request for CAF support to the federal government. The 
request is then routed to the Minister of National Defence. The Minister then sends the 
request to the Chief of Defence Staff who assigns the request to the CJOC. Similar to the 
United States, when the situation is imminent, a local CAF commander can respond to 
the incident prior to approval through the formal chain of command. Known as a “Rapid 
Response Operation” (RRO), it may be utilized to “Save lives or alleviate human 
suffering “388 In the United States, a local commander has “Immediate Response 
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Authority” (IRA) to “Save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property 
damage.”389 
The Canadian Army, the RCN, and the RCAF are all participants when called on 
to support other Canadian governments during civilian emergencies. The last mission 
provided to civilians by the CAF due to wildfire was in July 2011 when northwestern 
Ontario residents were evacuated by military aircraft due to the threat from forest fires. 
Known as Operation FORGE, six C-130 aircraft flew 42 missions to evacuate 3,614 
persons.390 The CAF, however, does not utilize aircraft in the direct suppression of 
wildfires. The only support that CAF aircraft provide to civilian authorities is for 
evacuation of persons in danger from wildfires, to transport firefighters to fire locations, 
and to provide situational awareness. 
Unlike the United States, then, Canada does not utilize CAF aircraft for the direct 
suppression of wildfires. The use of military aircraft during civilian wildfires in Canada is 
limited to support activities only, such as the transportation of people and supplies. 
2. Australia 
Australia is covered by 125 million hectares (approximately 309 million acres) of 
forest, which accounts for 16 percent of Australian land and three percent of the world’s 
forests.391 Similar to the United States and Canada, Australia also routinely experiences 
wildfiresa. Known as “bushfires” in Australia, the Australian Department of Agriculture 
reports in its 2013 State of the Forests report that from 2006 to 2011, approximately 31.6 
million hectares experienced unplanned fires.392 To help fight these fires, aircraft are also 
used in Australia to combat bushfires. 
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In Australia, the National Aerial Firefighting Centre (NAFC) organizes the 
country’s efforts concerning aircraft and bushfire suppression. Their mission statement 
states, “NAFC provides national collaboration and cooperation; developing excellence 
and a safe, effective and efficient aerial capability; supporting and enhancing the delivery 
of landscape fire management in Australia.”393 The report indicates that Australia’s 
national fleet totals 77 fixed wing and rotor wing aircraft.394 These aircraft are used to 
drop water and retardant, provide aerial supervision, and gather intelligence. During the 
2013–2014 fire season, aircraft in Australia participated in 3,018 bushfire missions.395 In 
addition, the states and territories of Australia also contract with private aircraft for 
bushfire responsibilities.396 
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) provides support to civilians. The ADF 
comprises the Australian Army, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), and the Royal 
Australian Air Force (RAAF).397 However, ADF personnel generally do not receive 
training for response to bushfires. Specifically, the RAAF reports that in regards to its 
humanitarian efforts, “The majority of Air Force personnel do not receive specialist fire 
fighting training and are not trained to fight a bushfire.”398 The last time that the RAAF 
provided support to civilians for a bushfire was in 2013. In January of that year, supplies, 
such as generators and transformers, were delivered to Tasmania while in October in 
New South Wales, the RAAF and the RAN provided refueling assistance to firefighting 
aircraft, as well as food and accommodations for firefighters.399 
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Legal authority for the ADF to act within their country comes from two laws. The 
first is Defence Aid to the Civil Community (DACC) and the second is Defence Force 
Aid to the Civil Authorities (DFACA). DACC is used during civil emergencies, such as 
natural disasters or when the use of force is not anticipated. On the other hand, Michael 
Eburn, an associate professor at the Australian National University, states, “DFACA is 
used where it is anticipated that the DF may use force.”400 DACC, then, is the primary 
authority by which the ADF support citizens during disasters. 
The DACC is comprised of six categories by which the ADF may provide 
emergency support. The first three categories are applicable to bushfire disasters, among 
other situations. The first three categories of the DACC state: 
DACC Category 1 is emergency assistance for a specific task(s) provided 
by Local Commanders/Administrators, from within their own resources, in 
localised emergency situations when immediate action is necessary to save 
human life, alleviate suffering, prevent extensive loss of animal life, or 
prevent widespread loss/damage to property. Provision of DACC 
Category 1 assistance should not normally exceed 24 hours. 
DACC Category 2 is emergency assistance, beyond that provided under 
Category 1, in a more extensive or continuing disaster where action is 
necessary to save human life or alleviate suffering, prevent extensive loss 
of animal life, or prevent loss/damage to property, and when 
State/Territory resources are inadequate. 
DACC Category 3 is assistance associated with recovery from a civil 
emergency or disaster, which is not directly related to the saving of life or 
property.401 
Categories 4, 5, and 6 of the DACC are applicable to non-emergency situations. 
ADF response to civilian emergencies is coordinated through the Joint Operations 
Support Staff (JOSS) and the Military Strategic Commitments (MSC). 
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The ADF works to manage citizen expectations concerning bushfires, and 
whether Defence personnel will be fighting the fires. ADF personnel are not directly 
involved as firefighters during bushfires. An Australian National Audit Office report 
states, “In fact, the most common and effective use of Defence resources during a 
bushfire is in a support role, providing refueling of commercial and civilian aircraft, 
transporting equipment and personnel, and providing base services.”402 
Like Canada, Australia does not utilize military aircraft for bushfire suppression 
missions using water or fire suppression retardant. ADF aircraft are only used in support 
roles, such as transporting firefighters and equipment, evacuating citizens, and other 
similar roles. 
B. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH U.S. POLICY 
The U.S. DOD utilizes its personnel, tools, and equipment to support civilians 
during natural disasters and other emergencies. Like most western nations, Canada and 
Australia also use their respective militaries during civilian crises. The United States can 
learn from Canadian and Australian practices, specifically in the area of deploying 
military aircraft to civilian wildfires. 
1. Resource Use 
The U.S. wildfire suppression aircraft system is overseen by the NICC in Boise, 
Idaho.403 The NICC is supplemented by many regional dispatch centers, but its task is 
difficult with many resources and a large geographic area to manage. Also, state and local 
dispatch centers may directly request aircraft for wildfire suppression. In addition, the 
large numbers of both civilian and military aircraft dispersed throughout the country, 
which are owned and/or operated by a variety of agencies, make the coordinated use of 
wildfire suppression aircraft complicated. When compared to the system of aircraft 
management during wildfires in both Canada and Australia, which each has one national 
agency that manages the use of all aircraft during wildfires, the U.S. system appears to be 
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handcuffed by the number of aircraft, the number of resource-sharing agreements, and the 
decentralized system employed throughout the states individually and nationally. 
Although the creation of a similar system is not restricted by any legal barriers, it would 
be difficult for the United States to emulate the current national systems of either Canada 
or Australia. 
Another difficulty for the United States in instituting a similar system to Canada 
or Australia is institutional. The current system has been in place for many, many years. 
Further, the culture of independence in the United States limits the willingness of local 
and state governments to give up control of emergency response in their jurisdictions to a 
system of management that shares resources on a national level. 
The wide variety of agreements in place for the use of wildfire aircraft also 
contributes to difficulty in the U.S. agreements between private agencies, governmental 
entities, and private and public agencies are all commonplace in the United States. Both 
civilian and DOD aircraft are included in these many agreements, which creates 
inefficiency, confusion, and potentially competing interests. The competition for and 
between aircraft may be the primary struggle between the U.S. system and the Canadian 
and Australian systems of wildfire aircraft management. 
In Canada, the use of aircraft for fire suppression is coordinated by the CIFFC. 
Canada has developed one national agreement for the sharing and management of 
resources, including aircraft. The agreement was developed in 1982 and is known as the 
Mutual Aid Resource Sharing (MARS) agreement.404 Regarding the MARS program 
provided by the CIFFC, Larson, Tsang, and McAlpine reported, “Interagency resource-
sharing would not work on the national level without CIFFC since the overhead of calling 
and coordinating with all provinces would be too much for individual agencies to 
bear.”405 The MARS agreement specifically addresses the sharing of aircraft and includes 
private aircraft contracted for wildfire suppression. One limitation to the MARS, 
                                                 
404 Kate Larson, Rob McAlpine, and Alan Tsang, Sharing of Firefighting Resources, Technical Report 
CS2012-11 (Waterloo, ON: University of Waterloo, 2012), 1. 
405 Ibid., 9. 
 115
however, is that it does not coordinate helicopters for wildfire suppression. Helicopters 
are shared throughout the provinces.406 
Australia also coordinates its firefighting aircraft via one central agency. The 
NAFC, through its Resource Management Agreement (RMA), provides for the oversight 
and coordination of wildfire suppression aircraft. In addition, the NAFC has recently 
implemented a service known as ARENA. ARENA is a national information system to 
support fire and emergency aviation activities.407 The NAFC also includes contracted 
aircraft within its resource coordination. 
While possible, it is unlikely that the United States could overcome the current 
system of independent agreements, management, and control to develop a system such as 
Canada’s MARS or Australia’s RMA to coordinate the use of aircraft during wildfires. 
Too many resources and existing agreements may exist to manage air tankers and 
helicopters across the vast geography of the United States . Establishing a more effective 
national coordination of aircraft resources for wildfires suppression may be a topic for 
future research. 
2. Civil-Military Interface 
The United States, Canada, and Australia all deploy military assets within their 
borders and is referred to as the “civil-military interface.” All three countries implement 
response to disasters, including wildfires, within similar authorities. As noted by Morag, 
although, “Unlike the United States (with the restrictions on the domestic use of the 
military through posse comitatus and other legislation), most democratic countries have 
far less reluctance regarding employing the military domestically.”408 Two aspects of 
civil-military interface are compared. 
First, the U.S. DOD, under the IRA, permits individual installation leadership to 
deploy assets under their direction to impact three conditions. These conditions are, “To 
                                                 
406 Marc Mousseau (CIFFC), email message to the author, August 5, 2015. 
407 National Aerial Firefighting Centre, 2014 Annual Report, 12. 
408 Morag, Comparative Homeland Security: Global Lessons, 207. 
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save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage.”409 The CAF 
implements RRO only for the purpose of saving lives and alleviating human suffering. 
The ADF, via DACC Category 1, responds to disasters when immediate action is 
necessary, “To save human life, alleviate suffering, prevent extensive loss of animal life, 
or prevent widespread loss/damage to property.”410 See Table 1. 
Table 1.   Civil-Military Interface, Immediate Response Comparison 
United States Canada Australia 
Immediate Response 
Authority 
Rapid Response Operation Defence Aide to the Civil 
Community, Category 1 
Save lives Save lives Save human life 
Prevent human suffering Alleviate human suffering Alleviate suffering 
Mitigate great property 
damage 
 Prevent extensive loss of 
animal life 
  Prevent widespread 
loss/damage to property 
 
In the example shown in Table 1, the United States seems to have developed a 
good balance of civil-military interface for responding to civilian emergencies when 
compared to Canada and Australia. The U.S. DOD may desire to decrease its domestic 
obligations and drop the IRA provision to “mitigate great property damage.” On the other 
hand, the U.S. DOD may want to increase its responsibilities to “prevent extensive loss of 
animal life.” The doctrine that guides the IRA would have to be amended to implement 
either case. No known legal barriers are evident if either change were to be enacted. The 
primary drivers for the U.S. DOD changing its IRA policy would likely be fiscal and 
mission readiness. 
Second, the U.S. DOD has prepared military aircraft for wildfire suppression 
activities including both rotor wing aircraft (helicopters) and fixed wing aircraft (air 
tankers). Helicopters have a cable with a bucket that carry and drop 660 gallons of water 
                                                 
409 United States Department of Defense, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) Handbook: 
Tactical Level Commander and Staff Toolkit, 3–3. 
410 Australian Government Department of Defence, Defense Instructions General, 3. 
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or 2,000 gallons of water depending on the aircraft.411 Air tankers use MAFFS to drop up 
to 3,000 gallons of water or fire retardant.412 MAFFS capabilities are similar to USFS or 
contract aircraft, although VLATs such as a DC-10 can disperse up to 11,600 gallons of 
water or fire retardant.413 The CAF and the ADF, however, do not use military aircraft to 
drop water or fire retardant during wildfires. Both the Canadians and the Australians use 
their military aircraft exclusively in support roles, such as the transportation of equipment 
and personnel. 
The U.S. DOD, then, may consider abandoning the current practice of modifying 
aircraft to perform suppression duties during civilian wildfires. Implementing this 
decision would amend the existing institutional and historical practice of the DOD. Like 
the decision to modify the IRA, eliminating aircraft suppression capabilities would 
require policy change but would not have legal implications. Among the benefits to this 
decision is less national confusion in where and when military aircraft could be deployed 
to civilian emergencies and cost savings for the military due to a smaller mission set. One 
downside would be fewer air assets available nationally to control wildfires. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The United States, Canada, and Australia all deploy aircraft in response to 
wildfire. The Canadians and Australians use one primary national resource-sharing 
system for deploying their aircraft. In addition, although all three countries utilize their 
military assets within their respective borders, differences occur in how and when the 
military assets are deployed. Finally, Canada and Australia differ in their use of military 
aircraft for civilian wildfire situations, specifically, Canada and Australia do not use 
military aircraft for dropping water, foam, or fire retardant. Based on the policies and 
practices of Canada and Australia, the United States should consider the following 
recommendations for responding aircraft to wildfires: 
                                                 
411 “The Use of Military Helos on WUI Fires,” May 27, 2013, http://www.firefighternation.com/ 
article/wildland-urban-interface/use-military-helos-wui-fires. UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters use buckets 
that carry 660 gallons of water. CH-47 Chinook helicopters use buckets that carry 2,000 gallons of water. 
412 National Wildfire Coordinating Group, Interagency Aerial Supervision Guide, 68. 
413 “The Plane,” accessed May 31, 2015, http://www.10tanker.com/the-plane.html. 
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 The United States should develop a single aircraft resource-sharing plan 
for wildfire suppression similar to Canada’s MARS and Australia’s RMA. 
 The United States should maintain its IRA in its current format. 
Expanding to include animals similar to Australia’s DACC Category 1 
may add to an already taxed responsibility. 
 The United States should reconsider its use of military aircraft for 
dropping water or fire retardant to suppress civilian wildfires, and possibly 
limiting aircraft actions to safer and less controversial support roles. 
1. Recommendation #1 
The need for a comprehensive plan in the United States has been previously 
identified. In 2006, an interagency working group developed a national strategy for 
wildfire aviation.414 However, the plan did not provide specific recommendations for 
resource sharing. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a state-
to-state resource-sharing plan already in existence. The EMAC may be a model for the 
development of a national system for sharing aircraft used in the suppression of 
wildfire.415 Recommendation #1 is that the United States research, identify, and design a 
single national system for the use and sharing of wildfire suppression aircraft similar to 
those currently in use in both Canada and Australia. 
2. Recommendation #2 
The U.S. DOD, like the CAF and the ADF, already has an existing plan for 
deploying military resources to disasters within the United States. Each of the three 
countries has identified conditions by which military resources may be utilized. The 
United States has three principles (briefly,-lives, suffering, property) while Canada has 
two principles (lives and suffering) and Australia has four principles (lives, suffering, 
animals, property). The U.S. plan appears to strike a moderate balance between the other 
two countries. While Canada does not deploy the military domestically to save property, 
                                                 
414 National Association of State Foresters, United States Forest Service, United States Department of 
the Interior, Comprehensive National Strategy for Use of Aviation Resources in Wildland Fire Management 
(Boise, ID: United States Forest Service, 2006), 15. 
415 “Emergency Management Assistance Compact Overview for National Response Framework,” 
accessed September 16, 2015, http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/EMACoverviewForNRF.pdf. 
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as the United States and Australia do; Australia also utilizes military resources to care for 
animals, which the United States and Canada do not. 
It is not known if a demand for the U.S. DOD to respond to incidents exists, 
specifically involving animals at risk. From a wildfire-specific perspective, both 
domesticated farm animals and wildlife are killed by wildfires. The number of animals, 
domestic or wild, that die as a result of wildfires is unknown. The USNORTHCOM is 
responsible for defending the homeland. Their mission indicates that its priorities include 
civil support and protecting U.S. interests.416 Some citizens would likely view expanding 
USNORTHCOM’s mission to include care of animals favorably. However, given that the 
U.S. DOD’s homeland mission is already extensive, it is not recommended that its 
mission be expanded specifically for the protection of animals. 
3. Recommendation #3 
The U.S. DOD deploys aircraft for a variety of missions to civilian emergencies, 
including wildfires. Both fixed wing air tankers and helicopters are used for a variety of 
assignments, such as transport of firefighters and equipment, fire suppression, 
surveillance, and many others. However, military aircraft used specifically to suppress 
wildfire are limited by strict guidelines.  
The U.S. DOD should consider adopting CAF and ADF practices for utilizing 
aircraft during civilian wildfire emergencies. Military aircraft in both Canada and 
Australia are used only in support roles, and not for direct firefighting suppression 
activities. Adopting a support strategy in the United States would decrease conflict 
regarding the deployment of both civilian and military aircraft. Australia actively 
educates its citizens regarding military capabilities for wildfire suppression.417 The 
United States should do the same if this change were adopted. Considering this change to 
the existing military mission set would decrease a taxed U.S. military homeland security 
mission. Although pros and cons can be proferred to utilizing military aircraft in civilian 
                                                 
416 “USNORTHCOM Mission,” May 16, 2013, http://www.northcom.mil/Newsroom/FactSheets/ 
ArticleView/tabid/3999/Article/563996/usnorthcom-vision.aspx. 
417 Australian National Audit Office, Emergency Defence Assistance to the Civil Community Audit 
Report No. 24 2013–2014, 39. 
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wildfire missions, it is recommended that the U.S. DOD research the use of its aircraft for 
water and retardant drops and consider limiting its service to civil authorities to support 
functions only. 
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